Historical Betrayals by Muslim Politicians Against the Tamil People
Historical Betrayals by Muslim Politicians Against the Tamil People
This is a historical account that everyone should read.
This is a compilation of historical records concerning the anti-Tamil and allegedly treacherous political actions pursued by Muslim political forces since Sri Lanka gained independence.
When the British were preparing to leave the country, a reasonable fear arose among Tamil leaders that Sinhala leaders, using their numerical majority, would oppress the minorities. The demand for equal 50:50 representation emerged precisely as a political safeguard against this domination.
When the Soulbury Commission came to Ceylon in 1944, G. G. Ponnambalam presented the demand for balanced representation with very strong legal and logical arguments.
His principal arguments were:
“No single community should obtain an absolute majority in Parliament and thereby impose its wishes upon the other communities.”
“If the 50:50 system were implemented, the Sinhala majority would necessarily have to seek the support of at least one minority community in order to form a government. This would encourage consensus.”
“For democracy not to become a dictatorship of the majority, the voting strength of minorities in Parliament must be equal.”
Muslim leaders refused to accept this demand. Instead of supporting G. G. Ponnambalam, they gave unconditional support to the Sinhala-majority side led by D. S. Senanayake.
Muslim leaders T. B. Jayah and Sir Razik Fareed openly opposed the demand.
When giving evidence before the Soulbury Commission, they argued:
“When our ancestors, the Arab traders, came to Ceylon, they learned the Tamil language for local and South Indian commercial relations. Therefore, Tamil may have become something like our ‘mother tongue’, but we are not of the ‘Tamil race’.”
“We are direct descendants of Arab traders who came from the Middle East, particularly from the Hashemite dynasty, during the eighth centuries and settled along the coastal areas of Ceylon. Therefore, we should not be classified together with the Tamils as a minority.”
By doing so, the strategy of D. S. Senanayake to “divide and rule the minorities” succeeded easily.
At the time, the Tamil side described the actions of the Muslim leaders as a “blatant betrayal.” They argued that if the Muslims had joined the Tamils and jointly insisted on the 50:50 demand before the Soulbury Commission, minorities in independent Ceylon would have received strong constitutional political protection.
Once the 50:50 demand was rejected and the new constitution was introduced in 1947, the fears of the Tamil minority became reality.
1948 — The disenfranchisement and loss of citizenship of the Hill Country Tamils
During this event, which is regarded as a black mark in Sri Lankan history, all the major Muslim political leaders fully supported the legislation and voted together with the Sinhala government.
During parliamentary debates, Muslim leaders did not view the Hill Country Tamils from an ethnic perspective as “Tamils,” but instead advanced strong arguments against them.
They referred to them as:
“Indian coolies.”
“They came here only to earn money.”
“Giving them representation in Parliament is equivalent to handing the country over to foreigners.”
The leaders of the Muslim community were predominantly merchants and conservatives with capitalist outlooks. They also strongly opposed the establishment of Marxist ideology in Sri Lanka. Therefore, they willingly supported Senanayake’s efforts to marginalize the Hill Country Tamils, who constituted an important electoral base for the left-wing parties.
Although he initially opposed this, G. G. Ponnambalam eventually committed the same betrayal against the Hill Country people because of his desire for office. As a result, several leaders left the Tamil Congress in protest and formed the Ilankai Tamil Arasu Kachchi (Federal Party).
In the 1915 riots against Muslims, the Hill Country Tamils had protected Muslim people, provided them with shelter and stood as a shield for them. Muslim politicians, however, forgot the gratitude they owed to the Hill Country Tamils and instead joined the Sinhala nationalist government involved in that very ethnic violence, accepting ministerial positions and committing what is described as a grave betrayal of the Hill Country Tamils.
1956 — The Sinhala Only Act
With the exception of A. M. A. Azeez, most Muslim political leaders supported the Sinhala Only Act and joined hands with the government.
They used the same “Arab argument” that they had presented before the Soulbury Commission in 1944 and used it to justify their position in Parliament.
During the parliamentary debates, Sir Razik Fareed openly stated:
“Muslims are not Tamils by race. Tamil is not our mother tongue either. Our ancestors learned Tamil for commercial purposes. Therefore, language is merely a means of communication for us. Since we learned Tamil then, we can also learn Sinhala if it becomes the language of government today.”
They thereby demonstrated that while fighting for the Tamil language might be a political right of the Tamils, Muslims had no emotional attachment to the Tamil language. They strongly supported the Sinhala Only Act on the grounds that:
“Standing with the Sinhala-majority government is the only practical course available to us.”
1957 — The Bandaranaike–Chelvanayakam Pact
The Bandaranaike–Chelvanayakam Pact, signed in 1957, was an important turning point in the history of the struggle for the rights of the Tamils of Sri Lanka. It is regarded as the first official agreement to recognize Tamil political rights and some form of devolution of power.
Under the pact, regional councils were to be established by combining the Northern and Eastern Provinces, with powers over agriculture, education, health and other matters. Sinhala colonization in the traditional Tamil areas was to be prevented. Tamil was also to be recognized as the national language of the minority and as the administrative language of the Northern and Eastern Provinces.
Muslim political leaders showed even greater opposition to this limited degree of devolution than the Sinhala nationalists.
Muslim leaders, particularly Sir Razik Fareed, argued that if the Northern and Eastern Provinces were merged and regional councils established, Muslims living in the Eastern Province would become a minority and come under Tamil domination.
They openly argued in Parliament:
“We are accustomed to living under the Sinhala majority; but living as a minority under the Tamils would completely destroy the political and economic existence of the Muslims.”
Eastern Muslim leaders attempted to obtain ministerial positions by maintaining close relations with the government in Colombo rather than joining the Tamils in demanding provincial rights. Consequently, they opposed the Bandaranaike–Chelvanayakam Pact.
When Tamil leaders opposed the settlement of Sinhalese people in the Eastern Province, Muslim leaders fully supported such settlement. They calculated that if Sinhalese people settled there, the Tamil voting strength in the Eastern Province would decline and the political bargaining power of Muslims would increase.
When Sinhala nationalism rose against the pact, Muslim politicians strengthened the arguments of Buddhist monks both inside and outside Parliament by claiming that:
“This agreement is also against the security of the Muslims.”
The position of the Muslim leaders greatly assisted Buddhist nationalists in arguing:
“See, this is not merely an agreement against the Sinhalese; even the Muslim minority opposes it. This is a conspiracy to create a separate state for the Tamils.”
This Muslim support gave Buddhist monks the confidence and perceived legitimacy to surround the Prime Minister’s residence and force the agreement to be torn up.
Under this pressure, Prime Minister S. W. R. D. Bandaranaike announced in May 1958 that he would unilaterally abrogate the Bandaranaike–Chelvanayakam Pact.
Nevertheless, the great ethnic riots of 1958 followed.
1958 — The ethnic riots
The 1958 riots were the first major organized ethnic violence directed against the Tamils in Sri Lankan history. The violence erupted while Tamils were peacefully protesting against the Sinhala Only Act and the use of the “Sri” script.
More than 500 Tamils were brutally killed, and many were burned alive. Tamil property was destroyed. Because Tamils were specifically targeted in southern Sri Lanka, more than a thousand people were left homeless and sought refuge in refugee camps. Because of the lack of security, the government transported them by ship to Jaffna.
The Sinhala government banned the Ilankai Tamil Arasu Kachchi (ITAK), led by S. J. V. Chelvanayakam, and placed Tamil political leaders under house arrest.
During an episode of violence, morality requires one to stand with the victims. But what happened in 1958 was different.
Muslim political leaders of the time made numerous statements, both inside and outside Parliament, that justified the political position of the Sinhala government and placed the blame for the riots on Tamil political leaders themselves.
They openly accused them, saying in effect:
“Tamil politicians unnecessarily provoked the Sinhala majority under the guise of satyagraha. The stubbornness of Tamil politicians was responsible for this violence. Because Tamil people refused to obey the laws of the majority government and took to the streets in protest, they brought this situation upon themselves.”
Muslim leaders did not criticize the government or police for standing by while the riots took place. Instead, they justified the actions of the Bandaranaike government and gave it a certificate of approval for supposedly maintaining law and order, while placing the entire blame for the violence on the Tamils.
While thousands of Tamil people had lost their homes and lives and were living as refugees in camps and on ships—with Tamils being transported by ship from Colombo to Jaffna—Muslim leaders from the same minority community stood on the side of the government and spoke in a tone suggesting:
“This is the consequence of what you brought upon yourselves.”
For the Tamil people, the actions of fellow members of a minority community who justified the aggressor caused more pain than the aggressor himself.
1965 — The Dudley–Chelvanayakam Pact
On 24 March 1965, the Dudley–Chelvanayakam Pact was secretly signed.
Its main provisions included making Tamil the administrative language in the North and East, giving priority to people from the relevant districts when allocating state land in order to prevent Sinhala colonization, and establishing district councils for the devolution of power.
When the proposal came before Parliament, Muslim politicians joined the SLFP led by Sirimavo Bandaranaike in strongly opposing it.
Muslim leaders calculated that if district councils were established, local administration in the Eastern Province would come under Tamil domination.
Muslim politicians who were accustomed to negotiating directly with the central government in Colombo and obtaining concessions from it feared that entering a local administrative structure under Tamil control would reduce their political power.
The principal reason Muslim leaders opposed the district councils was control over land. They wanted to prevent state land from being allocated to Tamils and to reduce Tamil voting strength in the East through Sinhala settlement, thereby becoming the political force capable of determining outcomes.
To overthrow the Dudley Senanayake government, the SLFP used propaganda designed to inflame ethnic sentiment. Among the Sinhalese, it was claimed that “the country is being sold to the Tamils,” while among Muslims, P. M. [Badi-ud-din] Mahmud promoted the message that Muslims would “become slaves to the Tamils.”
Emotional language was required to turn one community against another. The word “slave” was deliberately used for this purpose.
Among ordinary Muslims in the Eastern Province, who lived closely intertwined with Tamils through commerce and social relations, this language easily generated an imagined ethnic hostility toward Tamils and a sense of insecurity.
The propaganda was spread through mosques and political platforms:
“If the Tamil demand for federalism succeeds, they will unite the North and East and establish their own kingdom, in which Muslims will have no rights.”
Unable to withstand the continuous racist propaganda of Buddhist monks, Sinhala nationalists and Muslim politicians, Dudley Senanayake announced in July 1968 that he would abandon and tear up the proposal.
The Tamil people regarded it as a historical betrayal that another minority community living alongside them had joined hands with the majoritarian government and helped bring about their defeat.
1971/1972 — Standardization of education against Tamils
The government of Sirimavo Bandaranaike introduced a system of “standardization” for university admission.
The Minister of Education at the time was the Muslim leader Badi-ud-din Mahmud. He implemented the standardization system rigorously. It darkened the future of Tamil students.
Before the 1970s, Tamil students from Jaffna and Colombo occupied a large proportion of places—approximately 40% to 50%—in the medical and engineering faculties of Sri Lankan universities.
In order to reduce this proportion, the Sirimavo government introduced the system of standardization.
Initially, this was implemented on a language basis: Tamil-medium students were required to obtain higher marks than Sinhala-medium students.
As Minister of Education, Badi-ud-din Mahmud defended the Sinhala government’s policy in Parliament, arguing:
“How is it fair to ask Muslim or Sinhala students from the Ampara District, who have no facilities whatsoever, to compete on the same scale with students from Jaffna?”
The standardization system directly damaged the educational prospects of Tamil students. Although the same examination paper was used, the system created a situation in which Tamil students could enter university only if they scored 20 to 30 marks higher than Sinhala students.
From the perspective of the Tamil people, intense anger developed over the belief that Muslim leader Badi-ud-din Mahmud had joined Sinhala nationalism and deliberately attacked education, which was their most important form of capital.
This further intensified the resentment between Tamils and Muslims.
1972 — Removal of Section 29, which had protected minorities
On 22 May 1972, the Soulbury Constitution was abolished and Ceylon was transformed into a republic. The new constitution was drafted by Minister Colvin R. de Silva.
This constitution became, in effect, a death knell for the minorities. Section 29 of the Soulbury Constitution, which had provided protection for minorities, was removed.
The only significant legal protection available to minorities under the British-established Soulbury Constitution was Section 29(2).
This provision stated that:
“Parliament could not enact any law that discriminated against any minority community or favored one community alone.”
These protections were removed, Buddhism was given constitutional prominence, and Sinhala was constitutionally established as the sole official language of government.
Tamil leaders walked out of Parliament in protest and resigned from their positions. Muslim politicians, however, gave their full support to the new constitution.
Muslim leaders who spoke about Islamic fundamentalism nevertheless supported without hesitation the granting of state recognition to Buddhism.
Badi-ud-din Mahmud and other Muslim MPs argued:
“Sri Lanka is historically a Buddhist country. Therefore, Muslims have no objection to giving special status to the religion of the majority. If Muslims are given the freedom to practice their religion, that is sufficient for us.”
The Sinhala Only Act introduced in 1956 was thereby incorporated into the constitutional framework in 1972. Even though official recognition of the Tamil language was denied, the Muslim leaders who had supported Sinhala Only once again welcomed the arrangement.
This constitution created a permanent division in minority politics in Sri Lanka.
- J. V. Chelvanayakam, who had continued to fight through peaceful means, completely lost faith in the legal system. After resigning his parliamentary seat, he officially put forward the demand for a separate Tamil Eelam through the Vaddukoddai Resolution in 1976.
This became the starting point for the armed struggle.
From the Tamil political perspective, the 1972 Constitution was a noose placed around the necks of the minorities. A deep wound remained in the Tamil collective memory: when the government prepared that noose, it was Muslim political leaders who stood beside it and justified it.
1979 — Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA)
In the 1977 general election, the UNP under J. R. Jayewardene came to power with a five-sixths majority. Muslim political leaders held extremely important cabinet positions in this government, on a scale never seen before.
This was the period when the Tamil people’s non-violent struggle had failed and Tamil youth began taking up arms.
To suppress the youth rebellion at its earliest stage, the Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA) was introduced in July 1979. Muslim leaders spoke in Parliament in support of it.
Foreign Minister A. C. S. Hameed played a major role in concealing state terrorism against the Tamils on the international stage.
When speaking at the United Nations and conferences of non-aligned countries, he justified the PTA and the atrocities of the Sri Lankan military internationally by arguing:
“What is happening in Sri Lanka is not an ethnic problem; it is a terrorist problem. A democratically elected government is merely taking measures to protect the country from armed groups.”
Tamil youth in the North and East were arrested in large numbers under the PTA and killed in torture camps.
The Tamil people found it impossible to accept that Muslim leaders from another minority community—such as M. H. Mohamed and A. C. S. Hameed—were justifying the state violence inflicted upon them both in Parliament and in international forums.
This gave rise to the bitter criticism among Tamil youth that:
“Muslim politicians are riding on the blood of the Tamils in order to obtain political positions.”
A common pattern can be seen throughout Sri Lankan political history: whenever Sinhala-majority governments introduced legislation against minorities, Muslim politicians acted as the mechanism that helped those governments obtain the two-thirds majority necessary to enact such measures.
1983 — Black July riots
During the riots, while Tamils were being killed in large numbers and their property was being burned, Muslim political leaders who were members of the J. R. government acted in support of and justification for the Sinhala government’s actions.
After the riots, J. R. Jayewardene did not express sympathy for the Tamils. Instead, he spoke in a manner that justified the anger of the Sinhala population. Muslim ministers in the government likewise justified the events in the same manner.
Muslim ministers such as M. H. Mohamed echoed the Sinhala government’s argument in Parliament and elsewhere:
“The Sinhala majority became angry and acted in this manner because Tamil youth took up arms and killed soldiers. Therefore, the blame lies with the Tamil terrorists demanding a separate state.”
The Black July riots completely destroyed Sri Lanka’s reputation internationally. Countries around the world accused Sri Lanka of a form of state-sponsored ethnic massacre.
However, the then Foreign Minister, A. C. S. Hameed, became deeply involved in concealing the events internationally and protecting the government.
Speaking at the United Nations and international forums, Hameed argued:
“This is not state oppression against a minority. It is merely an unexpected riot caused by the provocation of a terrorist group seeking to divide Sri Lanka. The government is bringing the situation under control and protecting the minorities.”
While the riots were taking place, Muslims living in Colombo took great care to distinguish themselves from the Tamils.
They wrote signs in Sinhala on their shops and homes saying things such as:
“This is a Muslim shop.”
“We are not against the Sinhalese.”
At the same time, some Muslims did provide shelter to Tamil people.
Muslim politicians, concerned primarily with the security of their own community, maintained silence and avoided creating any conflict either with the majority’s violent mobs or with the government.
The conduct of Muslim political leaders during Black July 1983 had a profound psychological impact on the Tamil people.
When their homes were burning and their relatives were being killed in the streets, Muslim ministers who continued to enjoy positions in the same cabinet not only failed to lift a finger to stop the violence; they also acted as the government’s international representatives and as shields protecting the government that was responsible for the destruction of the Tamils.
The Tamil nationalist movements developed a deeply rooted belief after these historical events of betrayal that Muslims would never stand in solidarity with the Tamils.
Following the 1983 riots, Muslim politicians increasingly aligned themselves with Sinhala nationalism and, beyond political betrayals, also became involved in serious injustices and acts against the Tamil people at the armed level.
1987 — Opposition to the merger of the North and East
Those who had said in 1944:
“We are Arabs who came for trade, and Tamil is our commercial language”
were now, in 1987, asking:
“How can we claim to be indigenous inhabitants of the Eastern Province? How can a migrant trading community suddenly become indigenous to a land?”
When the North and East were merged under the Indo-Sri Lanka Accord of 1987, a deeply contradictory argument emerged in Muslim politics.
They argued:
“Our ancestral land cannot be incorporated into the Tamil homeland concept, nor can it be merged with the North without asking us.”
In 1944, Colombo’s Muslim leaders had dismissed Tamil, their “mother tongue,” as merely a tool in order to politically distinguish themselves from the Tamils. Yet when Tamils claimed the territory of the Eastern Province, which was inhabited by people who spoke the same language, Muslim leaders in the East began insisting:
“This is our ancestral land.”
The Muslim claim of “Arab ancestry” is fundamentally a historical contradiction and an example of political opportunism.
On the one hand, they identify themselves as “Arabs” in order to distinguish themselves from Tamils; on the other, they claim to be the “indigenous inhabitants of the Eastern Province” in order to oppose the Tamil demand for the merger of the North and East. These historical records demonstrate, according to this account, that Muslim ethnic-nationalist politicians have repeatedly employed destructive politics aimed at obstructing and depriving the Tamil people—an indigenous national community—of their rights.
After historically committing numerous injustices against the Tamil language, the Tamil people and minorities by joining hands with Sinhala nationalism, they have created a community that points the finger at others while claiming:
“We have caused no harm to anyone; we are the community that has been victimized.”
These historical records, according to the author, clearly demonstrate the extent of the racist hostility and antagonistic mentality that Muslim politicians have historically held toward the Tamil people.
Translation by Hari
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