Chapter II: Indian Intervention in Sri Lanka

The Negative Critique

The Black July communal holocaust created the necessary space, the right conditions and the rationality for Indian intervention in Sri Lanka. Indian involvement began during the July riots of 1983 and ended in March 1990 with the withdrawal of the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) from the island bringing to conclusion a critical and controversial period in Indo-Sri Lanka relations. During this lengthy period of seven years, India’s interference assumed different forms at different stages gradually evolving into an extremely difficult and complex engagement. It had political, military and strategic ramifications.

On the political level, the process began as an urgent humanitarian intervention to prevent the genocidal violence unleashed against the defenceless Tamil civilian population. This politicodiplomatic effort soon transformed into a prolonged mediatory exercise lasting nearly four years and ending in the formulation of a bi-lateral agreement, the famous Indo-Lanka Accord. The Accord provided a package of devolution for the resolution of the ethnic conflict. On the military level, the initial interventionist approach consisted of covert operations during which India helped to buildup the armed resistance movement of the Tamils. Military training facilities and arms were provided to the Tamil militant organisations to militarily pressurise the obstinate and reluctant Jayawardane regime to seek a negotiated political settlement to the Tamil national question. In the latter stages, the military involvement became direct and overt with the induction of the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) to disarm the Tamil Tigers and to implement the obligations of the Indo-Sri Lanka Accord. Finally, on the geo-strategic level, Indian involvement sought to remove the presence and interference of adverse external forces, which the Indians feared could create conditions to destabilise India’s security and strategic environment. This strategic objective was achieved with the inclusion of certain binding clauses in the exchange of letters that accompanied the Indo-Sri Lanka Accord.

For the Indian government this immense interventionist exercise, with all its ramifications, ended up as a diplomatic disaster and a foreign policy debacle. The Indo-Lanka Accord and the behaviour of the IPKF did nothing to contribute to the resolution of the ethnic conflict. Both the Sinhalese and the Tamils, for different reasons, opposed the signing of the Indo-Lanka Accord and the presence of Indian troops in the Tamil homeland. The disarming campaign of the IPKF turned into a low-intensity guerrilla war, which brought phenomenal suffering to the Tamil people with heavy loss of life and massive destruction of property. The Indian troops behaved as an occupation army and committed war crimes that shocked the Tamil nation, which had previously looked to India as a guardian and protector.

The presence of the Indian troops and the signing of the Accord generated an explosive situation in the Sinhala south. The militant Marxist movement, the Jathika Vimukthi Peruma (JVP), organised an insurrectionary rebellion against the Sri Lanka state as a protest against the Indian military presence on Sri Lankan soil. When President Premadasa assumed power in 1988, he initiated peace talks with the LTTE and demanded the withdrawal of the IPKF from the island. As a consequence, relations between the governments of India and Sri Lanka soured and came under severe strain. Ultimately the Government of India, under the Premiership of VP Singh decided to withdraw the IPKF. In March 1990 the last contingents of Indian troops withdrew from the island bringing to an end India’s highly controversial interventionist episode. This bitter, humiliating historical experience impelled Indian policy makers to adopt a cautious, hands-off policy of non-interference in the ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka.

Indian intervention in Sri Lanka became a topic for critical elucidation from different sources. The most vehement critiques came from India. Critical commentaries from Indian academics, political analysts and journalists blamed their own government for ‘unwarranted intrusion’ into the neighbouring island to sort out an ‘internal conflict’ and, in so doing, damaging India’s image in the world ‘as the champion of non-alignment’. Some analysts argued that Indian involvement to contain a major humanitarian crisis of genocidal proportions was unavoidable, yet it should have been limited to political and diplomatic engagement. They severely criticised the induction of the Indian army under the guise of a peacekeeping exercise. Other commentators, mostly Indian journalists, blamed the intransigence of the LTTE leadership and the ingratitude of the Sinhala government, particularly the Premadasa administration, for the failure of the Indian mediatory effort. Some of the military commanders of the IPKF, wondered in their memoirs, how a peacekeeping mission aimed to protect a friendly people turned into a war making exercise resulting in unacceptable casualties to their troops. On the Sri Lanka side there were critical articles, mainly from Sinhala journalists, whose commentaries, heavily prejudiced against the Tamil struggle, blamed India for training and arming Tamil rebel movements and criticised the IPKF for not completing their military mission of wiping out the LTTE guerrillas. Rohan Gunaratna’s work entitled ‘Indian Intervention in Sri Lanka’ is not a serious historical study on the topic but rather focuses on the role of India’s intelligence agencies in their ‘secret war’ against Sri Lanka.¹

On the Tamil side, the LTTE’s critique targeted two aspects of Indian intervention. These were areas that directly and adversely affected the Tamil people. One aspect severely censured the IPKF for the atrocities committed against the Tamil civilian population. The other criticised the set of proposals envisaged in the Indio-Sri Lanka Accord for the resolution of the Tamil national conflict. The organisation released wide-ranging critical material on those two issues. The LTTE publication ‘The Satanic Force’, a voluminous work for which I wrote a lengthy introduction, contains critical commentaries, eye witness accounts, statements by victims of rape and torture, signed affidavits and photographs, all implicating material that exposed the war crimes and the gross human rights violations committed by Indian troops in the Tamil homeland. The LTTE also published papers and documents offering critical analysis of the inadequacies of the framework of proposals conceived in the Accord. Though factual and based on actual events, the Indian side rejected as ‘negative polemics’ the LTTE’s revelations of the misbehaviour of the IPKF. One Indian commentator characterised the LTTE’s publication ‘The Satanic Force’ as ‘an exercise in malevolent propaganda against the Indian army’.²

In the intriguing, complex story of Indian involvement in Sri Lanka, the Tamil Tigers played a critical role. The state organisers of the July holocaust attributed the Tiger ambush at Tinneveli as the casual factor for the racial calamity that generated the conditions for Indian intrusion. From the outset, the LTTE was one of the Tamil rebel organisations involved in the clandestine Indian programme of military training. Drawn into the play of the Indian politico-military chess game, the Tamil Tigers participated in all the mediatory efforts undertaken by India to resolve the Tamil national question. Ultimately, in the final stages of Indian intervention, the LTTE became the protagonist, the principal party in armed confrontation with the Indian peacekeeping troops, also assumed the role of the chief negotiating party with the Sri Lanka regime seeking to end Indian military occupation. The LTTE’s role during this span of history has been complicated and politically sensitive, chartered with risks and danger. Nevertheless, the organisation survived the multiple hazards it faced. It is not surprising that the centrality of the LTTE’s role made it the object of negative criticism – primarily from the Indian side – for the politico- military disasters India suffered in the Sri Lanka affair. The bulk of the criticisms have been unfair and biased, based on a misreading of the true intentions and sincere commitments of the organisation. Reputed for its single-mindedness and deep commitment to a set of principles, the LTTE, during those turbulent times, made policy decisions and acted for the purpose of protecting and promoting the interests and aspirations of the Tamil people. Sometimes critical decisions were made, even at the risk of self-annihilation. In this chapter I wish to recount and discuss some critical events and episodes to explain the role and motivations behind the LTTE’s policy decisions during these times. As a person directly involved in these affairs, as the representative and advisor to the organisation, my intention is to counter unfair and biased criticism levelled against the LTTE and to record the historical process of events in proper structure and perspective reflecting the sentiments of the Tamil people.

India’s Strategic Concerns

The early 1980’s marked the last phase of the Cold War period of the Old World order. It was a tense period of heightened antagonism between the two super-powers. Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan alarmed the Reagan administration. As a consequence, the United States entered into a strategic partnership with Pakistan to contain the sinister designs of the ‘Evil Empire’ in the central Asian region. Exploiting the close military alliance with the Americans, Pakistan schemed to build-up its strategic capabilities to confront its traditional adversary, India. Meanwhile, fearing Soviet expansionism, China provided military and technical assistance to promote Pakistan’s covert war in Afghanistan. India felt insecure with these developments. Bound by a bi-lateral friendship treaty with the Soviet Union following the Chinese invasion, India could not claim to be a non-aligned power. Western powers situated India as an ally of the Soviet Union. When Afghanistan turned into a hotbed of super-power hostility, India became more concerned about the growing military partnership between the US and Pakistan. It was in these circumstances that Sri Lanka opened its doors for the penetration and consolidation of external forces adverse to Indian interests. Suspicious of ‘Indian hegemonic designs’ the Jayawardane regime turned towards the US, Pakistan, Israel, South Africa and China for arms assistance and military training to repress the Tamil insurgency.

The US operated in co-ordination with Israel and channelled military and technical assistance to Sri Lanka through the Jewish state. An Israeli ‘Interest Section’ was opened in the American Embassy in Colombo. Israel began to build up the Sri Lanka naval capacity and brought in intelligence agents from the Internal Security Service (Shinbet) to train the Sri Lanka armed forces and, especially the Special Task Force (STF) in counter-insurgency warfare. In the meantime, the US expanded the ‘Voice of America’ relay station with electronic intelligence facilities in Chilaw, north of the capital Colombo. Furthermore, the Americans also attempted to gain a contract for the Trincomalee oil tank farm through an overseas firm (an American outfit based in Singapore). The visits of General Vernon Walters, a senior figure in the US defence and intelligence establishments, to Colombo in October 1983 followed by Casper Weinberger, US Defence Secretary, further heightened Indian apprehensions concerning greater American involvement in Sri Lanka. The visits of these two high ranking American foreign policy makers generated suspicion in Delhi as to whether a secret defence agreement between the US and Sri Lanka was being formulated.

Following the July riots, Jayawardane invited into the country, operatives from the Keeny Meeny Service, a mercenary outfit involved in counter-insurgency activities. Having its operational headquarters in the Channel Islands, UK, the Keeny Meeny service provided special training to Sri Lanka’s police commandos. Sri Lanka also sought the assistance of Pakistan to train its military personnel. A special unit of Pakistan military instructors, who arrived in Sri Lanka following the July riots, trained a contingent of Sri Lanka troops. Pakistani training created the black garbed ‘Black Panthers’ or ‘Black Devils’, infamous for their massacres of Tamil civilians in the east, particularly in Trincomalee.

The growing involvement of the US, Israel and Pakistan and the presence of foreign intelligence operatives and counter-insurgency experts in the strategically important neighbouring island alarmed Delhi. Additionally, China was supplying a substantial amount of military material to Sri Lanka. At that juncture Delhi conceived this steady build up of external forces inimical to Indian interests as a serious threat, to her security and geo-strategic environment. What annoyed Mrs Indira Gandhi, who was at the helm of power in Delhi during that tense period, was the calculated exclusion of India by Jayawardane’s regime in seeking military and training facilities from foreign countries. Delhi was indignant with Jayawardane because he completely disregarded India’s strategic sensibilities and invited external forces adverse to Indian interests.

Mrs Gandhi had a compassionate understanding and sympathy towards the Tamils of Sri Lanka. From the beginning of the 1980’s she was fully briefed on the nature of the racist oppression the Tamil people faced. Apart from the government intelligence and diplomatic sources, Tamil political leaders from Sri Lanka and Tamil Nadu had made regular representations about the plight of the Tamils. Mrs Gandhi, a mature and seasoned politician, was aware of the Machiavellian mindset of Jayawardane and detested his racist policies. The Tamil ethnic issue made the inter-personal relations between the two leaders unfriendly and hostile. Mrs Gandhi was also deeply aware of the strong sentiments that prevailed among the people of Tamil Nadu towards the plight of the Eelam Tamils. Bound by the historical roots of ethnic and cultural affinities, the Tamils of South India and their political leaders were sympathetic and supportive of the aspirations and struggle of the Eelam Tamils.

The communal holocaust of July 1983 and the mass extermination of Tamils provoked an emotional upheaval in Tamil Nadu inflaming the passions of Tamil nationalism in the state. The Dravidian political parties competed with each other in staging mass protests and demonstrations in support of the Eelam Tamils bringing hundreds of thousands onto the streets. The Chief Minister of Tamil Nadu, Mr MG Ramachandran, an ally of Mrs Gandhi, demanded urgent Indian intervention. The Tamil Nadu leader called upon the Indian government to request the United Nations to send troops ‘to prevent the genocide of Tamils’. The political turmoil and the rising tide of nationalism in Tamil Nadu generated apprehensions in Delhi as to the possibility of a resurgence of Tamil secessionist tendencies. The other crucial factor that compelled Indira Gandhi to intervene in the Sri Lanka affair was the mass influx of Tamil refugees into South India following the July riots. Of the half a million people uprooted by the racial cataclysm, two hundred thousand sought asylum in India and the rest fled to western Europe, Canada and Australia as political refugees. Hence, the ramifications of the July riots precipitated critical conditions in Tamil Nadu compelling the Government of India to take action. Combined with this internal political compulsion was the external factor i.e. the penetration and consolidation of adverse external forces in her backyard island causing serious strategic and security concerns to India. These developments made Indian intervention in Sri Lanka an unavoidable historical necessity. On the issue of India’s involvement JN Dixit, former High Commissioner in his work, ‘Assignment Colombo’, observed:

‘India’s involvement in Sri Lanka in my assessment, was unavoidable not only due to the ramifications of Colombo’s oppressive and discriminatory policies against its Tamil citizens, but also in terms of India’s national security concerns due to the Sri Lankan government’s security connections with the US, Pakistan and Israel.’³

Mrs Gandhi, who was the chief architect of India’s foreign policy determinations at that time, made the historical decision to intervene in Sri Lanka. Her advisors formulated a two-pronged action strategy to achieve two cardinal objectives. It was an overt and covert operation, involving a transparent diplomatic mediatory effort on the one side and a clandestine military exercise to buildup and strengthen the Tamil armed resistance movement on the other. Though mutually contradictory, it was a well-conceived strategy to bring the cunning ‘old fox’ Jayawardane to his senses. One objective was to bring the island state under the sphere of influence of India by effectively shielding Sri Lanka from the penetration of external de-stabilising forces adverse to Indian interests. Exerting necessary military pressure through the Tamil rebel movements to compel Jayawardane’s administration to seek a negotiated political settlement was the second objective.

Mrs Gandhi’s politico-diplomatic initiative began soon after the outburst of ethnic violence in 24 July 1984. The brutal nature and the scale of violence unleashed against the Tamil civilians affected her deeply. Her immediate response was to telephone Jayawardane and express her displeasure. On her instructions, the Indian Foreign office released a statement warning Jayawardane that India could not remain unconcerned over the disturbing events taking place in her backyard. On 26 July, as the fury of racial violence continued for the third day, Mrs Gandhi despatched her Foreign Minister, Mr Narasimha Rao, to Colombo as her Special Envoy to study and report on the situation. Jayawardane received the Indian Minister and presented his assessment of events, naturally omitting how the state orchestrated the whole episode.Narasimha Rao’s visit was primarily aimed to initiate a mediatory process. Rao conveyed a message from the Prime Minister that India was willing to mediate for a negotiated settlement to the ethnic conflict, to which Jayawardane agreed. Following Narasimha Rao’s visit, Mrs Gandhi appointed Mr Gopalasamy Parthasarathy as India’s mediator.

G Parthasarathy was a Tamil Brahmin and a friend of the Nehru family. He was one of Mrs Gandhi’s chief advisors on foreign relations. A brilliant diplomat and tactician, as chairman of India’s Policy Planning Committee, he enjoyed Cabinet status. He was popular in Delhi and Tamil Nadu political circles.

To appease the agitated Tamils in both Tamil Nadu and Tamil Eelam, and since he was renowned for his wide political vision and would act to uphold Tamil interests and aspirations, Mrs Gandhi wisely chose him to be the mediator. Having accepted this difficult mission, Parthasarathy visited Sri Lanka on 25 August 1983 and commenced his negotiating process. However, the appointment of a Tamil Brahmin as India’s mediator irritated the Sinhala chauvinist elements, particularly the Buddhist clergy, the Sangha, who created serious obstacles to Parthasarathy’s efforts. Nevertheless, after extensive discussions with the political leaders of both communities and an indepth study of the issues underlying the ethnic conflict, Parthasarathy formulated a set of proposals called ‘Annexure C’, which envisaged regional administrative structures devolving power to provincial units.

Jayawardane and his senior Ministers opposed the proposals, yet the government, under Indian pressure, agreed to convene an All Party Conference (APC) to discuss the framework. Tamil political leaders reluctantly decided to participate in the APC knowing full well that it would turn out to be a futile exercise. The conference convened on 10 January 1984 and lasted for one year with 37 sessions being held. During the rounds of discussions Jayawardane allowed all the political parties and groups, including hard-line Buddhist monks, to deliberately complicate the negotiating exercise. At one stage the opposition Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) walked out of the APC, opposing the devolution package. This gave an excuse for Jayawardane to back track from the peace initiative, complaining of lack of consensus. Eventually the mediatory effort initiated by Mrs Gandhi to resolve the Tamil question through negotiations collapsed when Jayawardane’s Cabinet, on 26 December 1984, decided to drop the proposals.

From the outset, Mrs Gandhi was sceptical about the probability of success with the mediatory efforts to gain a fair deal for the Tamil people. She was aware that Jayawardane was a hardliner, a difficult and complex personality unsympathetic to the Tamil demand for political rights and freedoms. She also knew that he favoured a military solution to the Tamil issue.

Mrs Gandhi confided her deep distrust of Jayawardane to Parthasarthy during a briefing on his mediatory mission to Colombo. She was doubtful that Jayawardane would do justice to the Tamils and therefore the peace effort might not succeed.⁴ With this foresight, she formulated a two pronged strategy involving a covert military programme to enhance the fighting capacity of the Tamil freedom movement with the calculated objective of frustrating Jayawardane’s militaristic approach.

The covert operation was planned and executed by a team of three persons who were close confidantes of Mrs Gandhi and enjoyed powerful positions in India’s Defence and intelligence agencies. The principle strategist who masterminded the operation was RN Rao, the National Security Advisor, the person in charge of executing the clandestine exercise was Girish Chandar Saxena, head of the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW), the external intelligence agency of India. The third person was Shankaran Nair, the Director of the Prime Minister’s Secretariat who advised Mrs Gandhi on foreign relations. This three-person team under Mrs Gandhi constituted the ‘Third Agency’ or the Cabinet Secretariat (Security) who made crucial decisions on matters of national security and defence.

Having despatched Mr Parthasarathy on the overt mediatory mission, Mrs Gandhi launched the covert military operation through the ‘Third Agency’. The RAW undertook the most sensitive task of organising the military training programme for the Tamil militant organisations.

Indian Training of LTTE Cadres

In mid-August 1983, Mr Pirapaharan, from his guerrilla training camp in the northern jungles of Vavuniya, sent an urgent message to London, requesting my wife Adele and me to return to Madras (now Chennai) immediately. The Tiger leader’s message indicated that rumours were afoot in the Tamil homeland that the Government of India had started a covert programme to train Tamil fighters and the Tamil Eelam Liberation Organisation (TELO) was recruiting large numbers of youths and despatching them across the sea to Tamil Nadu. Describing the Indian initiative as a serious development, Mr Pirapaharan urged me to go to Tamil Nadu immediately to study the situation and inform him of the real facts. He also indicated that we might be permanently stationed in Chennai this time as Indian involvement had transformed the mode of the struggle. Adele and I had visited Tamil Nadu in 1979 and again in 1981 and spent several months each time working with Pirapaharan and his fighters, the history of which is written in my wife’s autobiographical work, ‘The Will to Freedom’. Adele’s book also provides details of events and episodes during our stay in Tamil Nadu from August 1983. To avoid repetition, I will only deal with issues pertaining to India’s involvement, particularly the relations between India and the Tamil Tigers.

Baby Subramaniam (Illam Kumaran), a senior leader of the LTTE who received us the Meenambakam Airport Chennai, found us accommodation at Woodlands, a modest vegetarian hotel in the heart of the city. Nesan (Ravi) and a few other senior cadres met us at Woodlands. Since the LTTE had no office accommodation or ‘safe houses’ in Chennai, two adjoining rooms in the hotel became our operational headquarters. Mr Kalimuttu, a senior Minister in Tamil Nadu Chief Minister MG Ramachandran’s government, offered to pay the hotel expenses until we found proper office premises. From Woodlands we made enquiries concerning the Indian training project. A Tamil Nadu journalist friend who himself was investigating the matter, advised me to contact RAW officials. In the meantime, an acquaintance, Dr Rajendran, a professor at the Singapore University and an LTTE supporter, visited me at the Woodlands Hotel with firsthand information concerning the Indian training programme.

Dr Rajendran informed me that three Tamil militant organisations, TELO, Eelam People’s Revolutionary Liberation Front (EPRLF) and Eelam Revolutionary Organisation of Students (EROS) had already been accepted by the Government of India for the project and were in the process of sending their cadres to military training camp, somewhere in north India. He revealed that RAW was responsible for the programme and the whole clandestine affair was being co-ordinated by Mr C. Chandrahasan, the son of the late Mr SJV Chelvanayagam, the leader of the Federal Party. Dr Rajendran slowly unravelled a hidden strategy by RAW that located Chandrahasan at the helm of affairs in the Tamil freedom struggle. He commented that Chandrahasan was willing to recommend the LTTE for the training programme, but on one condition. Naturally I enquired from him what the condition entailed. To my utter astonishment and annoyance, he had the audacity to propose that Mr Pirapaharan should accept Chandrahasan as the political leader of the Tamil liberation movement. He further said that all militant groups, after finishing the Indian training, would form the Tamil national army and carry on a guerrilla campaign while Chandrahasan led the political struggle on behalf of the Tamil nation. Adele had been following the conversation. On hearing this proposal she lost her composure. ‘Under no circumstances would Mr Pirapaharan or our fighters accept Chandrahasan as their leader. If that’s the condition we don’t need this Indian training,’ she shouted at him. A heated exchange followed. I supported Adele’s position. Dr Rajendran arrogantly asserted that the LTTE would never be able to gain access to Indian military assistance without Chandrahasan’s influential contacts in the intelligence agency circles and this would have disastrous consequences for the future growth and development of the organisation. He walked out of my room in anger.

I informed Mr Pirapaharan of the role Chandrahasan played and the conditions stipulated for the LTTE to gain access to the Indian training programme. Mr Pirapaharan outrightly rejected both Chandrahasan and the conditions and requested that I establish direct contacts with the Indian intelligence agencies. This posed a real challenge for me. How was I to circumvent Chandrahasan and establish contacts with a clandestine intelligence agency with no ‘office’ premises in Tamil Nadu? To my good fortune, we moved to a two-bed-roomed flat in Santhome, a suburb of Chennai. The local police and intelligence operatives were quickly informed of the presence of new residents in the locality. The contacts soon led to a meeting with Mr Alexander, Deputy Inspector General (DIG) of the Special Branch, Tamil Nadu Internal Intelligence. We subsequently met on several occasions and established a close rapport. He impressed me with his in depth knowledge of Sri Lankan politics and the characters involved. He knew of the covert military training programme and of Chandrahasan’s relations with RAW officials.

According to Mr Alexander, Chandrahasan occupied a floor of the Blue Diamond Hotel in the city and it was from there he operated. He further said that some of the RAW officials involved with Chandrahasan were corrupt and unscrupulous and advised me to avoid contacting them. In fact one of the RAWofficials with whom Mr Chandrahasan dealt, Mr Unni Krishnan, was later arrested by the Intelligence Bureau (IB) and imprisoned for passing information concerning the Indian training programme to CIA operatives.

I conveyed to him LTTE’s concern that they should also have access to the training programme. Mr Alexander advised me to write a comprehensive letter to Mrs Gandhi introducing the LTTE as the authentic armed resistance movement of the Tamils with a long history of guerrilla campaign and stating that the organisation wanted India’s military assistance. He further advised me to send a copy of the letter to Mr Saxena, the head of RAW in Delhi.

Within weeks of writing, Mr S Chandrasekaran, a south Indian Tamil holding a top position in the RAW establishment flew to Chennai to meet me. A secret meeting took place in a lodge on the outskirts of the city.

The authorities in Delhi assigned Chandraskeran to deal with the LTTE and our initial conversation revealed a man determined to fully comprehend the thinking of the movement with whom he would be working. He was an impressive personality. The nature of the questions concerning the LTTE’s ideology, political objectives and the structure of the organisation were shrewdly phrased and sophisticated and it was apparent that I was in discourse with a highly intelligent man particularly well informed in the art of covert warfare. Inevitably the subject of Mr Pirapaharan’s personality and political vision cropped up in the conversation. After a lengthy discussion he insisted that he should meet him to make arrangements for the training of LTTE cadres in India. He introduced me to a junior official called ‘Nayar’ as the contact between himself and the LTTE.

The details of this determining meeting with Mr Chandrasekaran, along with my advice for him to come to India to facilitate the arrangements for the training of his cadres, were immediately conveyed to Mr Pirapaharan. He dispatched two of his senior cadres, Mathya and Ragu, to Tamil Nadu to clarify the issue of his safety and freedom. Mathya and Ragu, when we met them in Madurai, were full of suspicion and viewed the offer of training as a trap by the Indian intelligence agencies to arrest their leader. Mr Pirapaharan was wanted by the Tamil Nadu law and order authorities following his escape from bail after the Pondy Bazaar shooting incident.⁵ I spent several hours, from midnight till morning, explaining to them that no harm would come to Pirapaharan since the Tamil Nadu Police and RAW had assured me of his security in India. Furthermore, I explained, their leader would be safe since the Indian Government had invited him to facilitate a covert military operation. I also wrote a lengthy letter to Pirapaharan giving an assurance of his safety and explaining the necessity of his mission. Mathya and Ragu left for Jaffna immediately carrying my correspondence. The following day I received a message from Tamil Eelam that the Tiger leader would be in India soon. I was relieved and pleased that Pirapaharan was convinced of my assessment and judgement of the situation and decided to come to India.

In October 1983, Pirapaharan arrived in India along with his senior cadres. He was staying in a rented house at a secret location in Pondicherry, a small neighbouring state of Tamil Nadu. A meeting was set up between the RAW officials and the LTTE leader. Adele, two bodyguards and I travelled the long journey to Pondicherry. I spent several hours with Pirapaharan relating details of the background events since we landed in Chennai. That night, at around midnight, Mr Chandrasekaran and his associates visited our residence. A closed-door meeting between Pirapaharan, Chandrasekaran and myself took place. An instant rapport was established between the top RAW official and the Tiger leader. Mr Chandran (he wanted us to call him by his shortened name. We referred to him as Mr Moon) offered to train 200 LTTE cadres in two batches of 100 at a time. The first batch would commence in early November. It would be necessary for the LTTE cadres to travel by train to Delhi where they would be met and transported in military trucks to an army complex in Dehra Dun, in the hills of Uttar Pradesh. He requested a complete list of details of the LTTE trainees as soon as possible. Pirapaharan enquired about the nature of the military training and the weapons systems to be provided. Chandran explained that highly skilled Indian military officers would provide the training in all aspects of modern warfare, and the use of small arms to heavy weapons. The training programme would include map reading, mine laying and the use of explosives and anti-tank and anti-aircraft weapon systems. Chandran made no commitment on the nature of arms assistance that India would provide, but said he would discuss the matter later. At the end of the meeting Mr Chandran invited the Tiger leader to Dehra Dun to observe the training of his cadres.

The Strategy Behind India’s Involvement

Pirapaharan was pleased with the meeting he had with Chandran. We avoided raising any controversial issues pertaining to the motivations behind India’s offer of military assistance. We wanted to establish a cordial relationship with the hierarchy of RAW. Mr Chandran, knowing that the Tamil Tigers were the most active guerrilla organisation militarily active in Tamil areas, got a detailed picture of the ground situation from the Tiger leader. Pirapaharan also assured him his cadres would be ready for training and that he would also accompany them to Dehra Dun. He carried out his pledge in a short space of time.

Hence, the LTTE became a player in the covert game launched by India. We made a conscious, calculated choice to participate because we had no alternative other than to swim with the currents of an inexorable historical process. The Indian intervention was unavoidable. It was a moral, altruistic urgency and geo-strategic necessity for India to contain a ruthless racist state bent on genocidal destruction of a minority Tamil nation in collusion with international forces with subversive intentions. Yet from the very beginning, we could grasp the motive behind India’s action. In this grand clandestine scheme, the Tamil resistance movement had been allocated a specific, limited role. It was purely a military function to destabilise Jayawardane’s regime and to frustrate his militaristic approach. The ultimate objective was to militarily compel Jayawardane to seek a negotiated political settlement with the Tamils. The LTTE leadership knew from the advent of Indian intervention that Mrs Gandhi had no intention of staging a Bangladesh type operation to create a separate Tamil state. The Tamil fighters were not given the role of Mukti Bahani’ (East Bengali rebels) to create a ground work for an Indian military invasion.⁶ The task assigned to Tamil guerrillas was to pressurise the Sinhala armed forces to a specific level of intensity until Jayawardane was tamed of his military arrogance. In this strategic plan, Mrs Gandhi envisaged a political settlement within a united Sri Lanka, a settlement that did not infringe the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the island. Having misread India’s overall strategy, some political leaders in Tamil Nadu as well as in Tamil Eelam entertained an illusion that Mrs Gandhi was planning a military invasion. Mr Pirapaharan did not have such fantasies. He was conscious of the fact that India was offering military assistance to engage the Tamil fighters as mercenaries to achieve a limited political goal. Even such a politico-military gamble, the LTTE leader was convinced, would ultimately fail because of the stubborn and inflexible attitude of Jayawardane’s regime. Though we realised the limited scope and the vulnerability of the Indian effort, we decided to take part in the programme, to be an active player in the process and enhance our military capability. If we did not participate in the Indian project our organisation, in the course of time, would be politically and militarily marginalised and eventually overwhelmed by other militant organisations who opted to receive Indian assistance to expand their manpower and firepower.

On the positive side, the Indian involvement was a morale boost for the Tamil struggle. India’s diplomatic engagement with Colombo internationalised the Tamil cause. The news of India’s offer of military training created such elation, euphoria and hope in the Tamil homeland it prompted thousands of young men to scramble to join the armed struggle. The young Tamils preferred to join the Liberation Tigers because of their dedication, discipline, achievements and, above all their growing popularity among the popular Tamil masses. But Mr Pirapaharan was not enamoured by the idea of over-inflating the ranks of the organisation by embracing every enthusiastic youth. Already hundreds had joined the movement immediately following the July riots. Pirapaharan was realistic and cautious. For him discipline was the more crucial than expansion. Furthermore, he was a firm believer in the systematic evolutionary growth of the organisational structure, particularly the military. Abnormal expansion, in his view, would cause serious problems of discipline leading to disintegration, a phenomenon that occurred later in the other militant organisations. The Tiger leader’s adherence to a strict code of conduct as the basis of recruitment opened the floodgates of youth to other militant groups. Thus, the Indian covert programme suddenly resurrected to active life all other dormant Tamil groups hibernating in Tamil Nadu. This upset the balance of forces to the disadvantage of the LTTE, which had been active on the ground in Sri Lanka and was evolving systematically into a highly disciplined guerrilla organisation. This sudden, unprecedented expansion of other militant organisations, some of whose ranks enlarged into thousands, posed a serious challenge to the LTTE but Mr Pirapaharan was not seriously disturbed. He hadhis own scheme to gradually strengthen and expand his liberationorganisation in time. The opportunities came in the year 1984 during which period the LTTE underwent massive structural transformation from a small underground guerrilla organisation into a wellorganised national liberation army.

The Indian military training to experienced, battle hardened Tiger guerrillas enhanced their skills, knowledge and fighting capability. The LTTE learned from the Indian military hitherto unknown elements of the art of modern warfare. But the scope of the training was limited to only two hundred fighters. The quantity of the arms supplied was small and the quality was very poor. Pirapaharan was deeply disappointed with the weapons systems. Most of the rifles, machine guns and mortars (60mm) were antiquated and unusable, he told me. We realised later that the Indian authorities did not want to provide modern, sophisticated weapon systems. It was a calculated policy to restrain the military capability of the Tamil rebel movement to a particular level of development. For Pirapaharan, who entertained a vision of creating an elite fighting formation with modern weapons systems, the Indian military inputs were totally inadequate. Though disillusioned with the weapons system he felt that the military training was useful. The other major obstacle that frustrated Pirapaharan’s yearning to expand and modernise his military structure was the lack of funds. The LTTE was practically bankrupt. We did not get any financial assistance from the Government of India. It was brought to our knowledge that the TELO, EPRLF and EROS were receiving funds from Chandrahasan, possibly channelled through RAW. Our situation became critical when we needed additional funds to cater for the new recruits. We were struggling with great difficulty, with little funds obtained from friends and supporters in the Tamil diaspora. At that time, the international Tamil diaspora was not fully mobilised and organised to backup the liberation struggle. In a situation where other Tamil militant organisations were fiercely competing with each other for dominance and supremacy, the LTTE faced a critical challenge. The organisation desperately needed funds to develop and expand. It was at this crucial juncture, the unexpected happened. We found a great benefactor, the Chief Minister of Tamil Nadu, Mr MG Ramachandran (MGR).

The events and circumstances that led to the successful encounter with this all powerful and popular leader and his magnanimous gesture of donating millions of rupees in support of our freedom struggle was given extensive treatment in an article entitled ‘MGR and the Tigers’ published in my Tamil language book ‘Liberation’. It is suffice to note that the close and intimate relationship developed between the Tiger leader and MGR and the firm political support and huge financial assistance provided by this legendary figure became the cornerstone for the development of the LTTE.

The War of Liberation Escalates

The entrance of MGR into the Tamil liberation struggle with a firm commitment to support the LTTE marked an historical turning point. With the new found availability of seemingly unlimited funds, Pirapaharan’s plans transformed into concrete reality. In 1984 the LTTE underwent rapid development and growth expanding its structures into a well-organised liberation force. New military camps were set-up in the remote jungles of Tamil Nadu. A large number of new cadres were recruited. Senior LTTE commanders who underwent special training with the Indian army assumed the role of instructors. Pirapaharan also allocated substantial amounts of money for the development of the political wing. In the meantime, large quantities of small arms and new heavy weapons were procured from the international arms market.

As the trained LTTE fighters returned to their bases in Tamil Eelam, the guerrilla campaign against the Sinhala armed forces intensified. The months of August and September marked the escalation of the war of liberation. More than one hundred military and police personnel were killed in attacks during those months. Several vehicles, including armoured cars, were destroyed and well-guarded police stations were attacked. These sustained guerrilla assaults in different areas of the Tamil homeland caused confusion, terror and demoralisation among the armed forces. I document below, in chronological order, some of the guerrilla operations by the LTTE fighters during the months of August and September 1984.⁷

On 4 August 1984 at Poligandy, a coastal village near Pt Pedro in the Jaffna peninsula, six navy men on morning patrol were killed and three others seriously injured in an armed confrontation with LTTE guerrillas.

The following morning a military convoy of three armoured cars, one truck and a jeep came under attack at Nediyadaku, a village near the coastal town of Valvettiturai in the peninsula. Nine police commandos were killed and many injured when the jeep they were travelling in received the full impact of the blast from the landmine hidden on the road. A senior police official, Assistant Superintendent of Police, Jayaratne was among the dead. On the same day a guerrilla commando unit raided the police station at Ottusuddan, a small town about 20 miles from Mulliativu in the northern province killing eight police personnel. The surviving officers fled.

Thirteen soldiers lost their lives on 11 August when LTTE fighters ambushed a military convoy on the Mannar-Poonagarin Road near Vellamkulam in Mannar district.

An assault unit launched a sudden attack on the heavily guarded Valvettiturai Police Station on the 14 August. An hour-long gun battle left several police and military personnel seriously injured.

Eight soldiers died at Karaveddy on 24 August when LTTE fighters ambushed and destroyed an armoured personnel carrier. In another incident on the same day a landmine explosion killed three military mine experts at Atchuvely in the Jaffna peninsula.

The LTTE military campaign continued and 20 police commandos were killed and more were seriously injured on 1 September when the guerrillas ambushed a police convoy en route at Thikkam, a village on the northern coast. On 10 September fifteen more soldiers were added to the rising armed forces casualty figures when another military convoy was attacked at Semmalai, again near the town of Mullaitivu.

While the Liberation Tigers intensified their guerrilla campaign and inflicted heavy casualties on the Sri Lankan armed forces, the other militant organisations started to carry out attacks in the latter part of 1984, escalating the Tamil insurrectionary violence. On 21 October 1984 a series of explosions rocked Colombo, causing panic and chaos in the capital. Ten blasts occurred in different locations of the city near important state institutions, killing three persons and injuring scores of civilians. EROS claimed responsibility for the blasts. Armed TELO cadres launched a well-planned attack on Chavakachcheri Police Station on 20 November, killing 24 policemen and completely destroying the building. The ability of the Tamil rebel movements to escalate their violent assaults on the capital alarmed the government.

The intensification of the guerrilla campaign by the Tamil liberation organisations with the active support of the Indian government shook Jayawardane. Yet he remained inflexible and intransigent. He refused to grant concessions to the Tamils even under severe military pressure. Because of the unyielding, hard-line attitude of the Sinhala political leadership, the All Party Conference, which had been deliberating on Parthasarathy’s proposals for several months, reached an impasse. India’s two-pronged strategy aimed at compelling Jayawardane to pursue a rational path of negotiated settlement, had no effect on the Machiavellian politician who refused to yield. At this critical juncture, an unforeseeable historical tragedy occurred to radically change Indo-Sri Lanka relations: Sikh bodyguards assassinated Mrs Indira Gandhi on 31 October 1984.

The sudden demise of Mrs Gandhi plunged the Tamil nation into deep despair and gloom. The shocking incident devastated all hopes and aspirations of the Tamil people. While the Tamils grieved, raising black flags in their homes and shutting down shops and schools, Sinhala soldiers danced with joy on the streets in Tamil areas. For the armed liberation movement, Mrs Gandhi’s death was a severe blow, an irreparable loss of a formidable moral force. As the Tamils feared, change in the corridors of power in Delhi following her assassination had its adverse effects on the Tamil struggle. She was a shrewd, sophisticated politician with a strong personality and had a profound knowledge about the complexity of the Sri Lanka political scene; an Indian leader sympathetic towards the plight of the Tamil people and determined to secure their rights and aspirations. But most importantly, Mrs Gandhi understood the mindset of Sinhala leaders well and knew how to make them apprehensive with her vague, ambiguous and acrimonious statements. Given the history of Mrs Gandhi’s historical role in the creation of Bangladesh, Jayawardane harboured a fear that Mrs Gandhi might launch an invasion of Sri Lanka over the ethnic issue and create a separate state for the Tamils. Commenting on Jayawardane’s apprehensions, Mr Dixit noted, ‘he often speculated to me that had Mrs Gandhi continued in power she would have broken Sri Lanka to two by 1985.’⁸ Mrs Gandhi’s death and the assumption to power of her son, the young, inexperienced, impulsive Rajiv Gandhi, had its negative fallout on Indo-Sri Lanka relations, to the grave disadvantage of the Tamils.

New Administration in Delhi

As soon as he assumed power as the Prime Minister of the largest democracy in the world and the regional superpower in south Asia, Rajiv Gandhi, influenced by new advisors and associates, wanted to effect changes in India’s foreign policy. He held the view that his mother’s policies towards India’s neighbours were aggressive and domineering. Furthermore, he was averse to some of the old guard who had been close to Mrs Gandhi in formulating foreign policy. Rajiv Gandhi did not favour Parthasarathy’s cautious and subtle diplomacy. He was impatient and impulsive and wanted concrete results quickly. Because of these contradictory approaches and perceptions, the relations between the two became antagonistic. Subsequently, in the early part of 1985, the role of Parthasarathy in handling the Sri Lanka issue was handed over to the new Foreign Secretary, Romesh Bhandari, a close confidante of Rajiv Gandhi. The new Prime Minister also favoured a radical change of policy towards Sri Lanka. President Jayawardane deeply impressed Gandhi when they met briefly at his mother’s funeral. Jayawardane, displaying his charm and shrewd diplomacy, presented himself as a wise old statesman, a devout Buddhist seeking friendship and a harmonious relationship with India. He introduced himself as a friend of Nehru and Mahatma Gandhi from the times of the Indian freedom struggle. Jayawardane also impressed on him that as a young Prime Minister of a great nation he had a tremendous responsibility in building up friendly relations with neighbours and to ensure peace and stability in the region. Touched by Jayawardane’s friendly gesture and wise admonitions, Rajiv told him that the approach of his administration towards Sri Lanka would be fundamentally different from his mother’s more partisan attitude. He assured Jayawardane that the new mediatory effort of his government would be neutral and objective. When Rajiv declared that his administration was committed to ensuring the unity, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Sri Lanka, Jayawardane was relieved of any apprehensions concerning India’s intentions. Thus the groundwork was laid for a new relationship and a new policy orientation towards Sri Lanka. Mrs Gandhi’s congenial policy towards the Tamils had come to an end.

In January 1985 I met Parthasarathy at his residence in New Delhi. He sounded dejected and dispirited. Clearly the sudden demise of Mrs Gandhi coupled with Rajiv’s cool and indifferent attitude toward him had had a demoralising effect on the aging diplomat. He proceeded to explain to me the new foreign policy perspective Rajiv’s administration would adopt. Friendly persuasion instead of assertive diplomacy would be the new approach taken by Delhi, he said. Convinced of Jayawardane’s ‘good intentions’ Rajiv believed that the Tamil issue could be resolved through peaceful means: through negotiations and dialogue. Talks would soon take place involving the Tamil rebel movements and a solution would be found within the unitary structure of Sri Lanka, he further elaborated. Mr Parthasarthy indicated to me that Mrs Gandhi’s covert operation would be dropped and a ceasefire would be enforced before the commencement of the negotiations. He confessed that he could not convince Rajiv of Jayawardane’s deceitful, duplicitous character. In the end he confided to me that he might not be able to play a determinate diplomatic role in the Indo-Sri Lanka affairs. His advice to the Tamil political organisations was for them to forge a unity, formulate a common programme and to prepare for a difficult and demanding negotiating process with the Sri Lanka state. Mr Parthasarthy also told me that the Indian intelligence agencies would soon brief us on the new policies and approaches of Rajiv’s administration.

On my return to Chennai I fully briefed Mr Pirapaharan on the contents of the conversation I had with Parthasarthy. He had been anticipating changes in India’s foreign policy following Mrs Gandhi’s death, so he was not perturbed to hear of the policy orientation of the new administration. At the same time, he was not in favour of a sudden cessation of armed hostilities at that juncture since he was planning military offensive operations. In the early part of 1985 two major offensive operations were launched against the Sri Lanka forces, one by TELO and the other by the LTTE.

On the night of the 19 January, TELO fighters blasted Colombo bound Yal Devi express train at Murukandy, a small town in Vanni, northern Sri Lanka, in which a contingent of troops were travelling. The explosion ripped through several carriages killing 22 military personnel and 10 civilians. Scores of soldiers were injured. TELO fighters also engaged military reinforcements that rushed to the scene of the explosion.

In the early hours of 13 February, heavily armed LTTE guerrillas launched a sudden attack on the well-fortified military camp at Kokilai, a strategically important coastal town in the Mullaitivu district. The battle lasted more than five hours. One hundred and six soldiers were killed, the heaviest casualties suffered by the army at the hands of the Tigers. Sixteen LTTE fighters died. It was a humiliating military debacle for the Sri Lanka army. Infuriated, Sinhala soldiers launched a retaliatory assault on a Tamil refugee camp near Mullaitivu town killing 52 civilians. When TULF leaders pleaded with India to intervene ‘to stop the genocide of Tamils’ Delhi maintained a calculated silence. This attitude of indifference indicated a change in India’s policy orientation towards Sri Lanka. This new policy, based on the principles of neutrality, non-interference, and negotiated resolution to the conflict was clarified to the LTTE and other Tamil militant organisations when they met the heads of Indian intelligence agencies in the early part of March 1985.

Mr Pirapaharan and I first met Mr Girish Chandra Saxena,⁹ the head of RAW, at a secret location in Chennai. Officials of the agency arranged the meeting. An imposing personality, very tall and fair with sparkling eyes, Mr Saxena spoke eloquently in his commanding baritone voice. The meeting was more a monologue than a dialogue; a lecture in which he outlined India’s policy and strategy, past (Mrs Gandhi’s) and present (Rajiv’s). The Government of India under Mrs Gandhi had serious geo-strategic concerns when Jayawardane invited external forces and agencies inimical to India’s interest into the island to crush the Tamil struggle.

The July ‘83 riots escalated to genocidal proportions, forcing hundreds of thousands of Tamil civilians to seek refuge in India, inflaming nationalist passions in Tamil Nadu and causing a serious destabilising effect on India’s national security. These adverse conditions, Mr Saxena explained, necessitated Indian intervention. The central objective behind India’s efforts was to contain the violence against the Tamil civilian populace, restore peace, ethnic reconciliation and, most importantly, stability in the region. He clarified further: the Tamil militant organisations were given military assistance to defend and protect the Tamil civilians and to prevent state military excesses. Mrs Gandhi had never entertained ideas to undermine the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the island. She wanted Jayawardane to give up the military option and to seek a political settlement within a united Sri Lanka. Mr Saxena said that India could not support the Tamil aspirations for a separate state since it would have far reaching implications in a country that had to deal with several secessionist movements. Staring at Pirapaharan, Saxena raised his voice ‘You should understand and appreciate India’s position,’ he declared. The new Prime Minister wanted to build better relations, friendly relations with Sri Lanka, Saxena explained. He would adopt a fresh, new methodology of mediation to initiate a peace dialogue involving all Tamil organisations in a congenial environment of peace and normalcy. Concluding, he said the time was fast approaching for Tamil armed organisations to cease all hostile offensive operations and prepare for talks with the Sri Lanka government under Indian mediation. With that he left: the meeting was over. He made no attempt whatsoever to solicit our views. His junior officials explained that he had to rush to attend another meeting with other Tamil organisations.

Mr Pirapaharan was neither surprised nor disappointed with Saxena’s explanation of India’s involvement in Sri Lanka affairs. He, however, was not pleased with the Indian proposal for a ceasefire; he felt it to be premature. Pirapaharan assumed that Jayawardane would not concede anything to the Tamils until the military power of the state had been weakened and its combat ability incapacitated. Furthermore, Pirapaharan viewed Rajiv’s assessment of Jayawardane’s intentions as fundamentally flawed.

A few days after the meeting with the RAW boss, we had an interesting encounter with Mr MK Narayanan, Director of India’s Intelligence Bureau (IB), again at a secret location, but this time in the ancient Hindu city of Kasi. Temperamentally, Mr Narayanan and Mr Saxena were poles apart. Mr Narayanan was affable and accommodative, a charming personality displaying an earnest disposition to listen to others opinions and aspirations. He encouraged us to be open and frank. Explaining the current thinking in Delhi, Mr Narayanan said that Rajiv’s administration had innovative ideas on conflict resolution and new approaches to inter-state relations. The centre wanted to create South Asia into a zone of peace and tranquillity, a politically stable region free from the interference of external forces of subversion. India, as South Asia’s super-power, had immense responsibilities to create a new order of peace and stability in the region by building friendly relations with her neighbours. With this new vision, Mr Narayanan explained, Delhi wanted to initiate a peace process to secure a negotiated settlement to the ethnic conflict. The Government of India, he said, expected cooperation and understanding from all Tamil political forces, particularly from the armed rebel movements, in seeking a settlement that would meet the genuine political aspirations of the Tamil people. Mr Narayanan then asked us as to whether we had any reservations about the government of India’s new initiative.

Pirapaharan and I explained to him the history of the intolerable conditions of state repression that led to the emergence of Tamil armed resistance. We reminded him that the Tamils were forced to adopt violent methods of resistance against the violence of the state after decades of non-violent agitations premised on Gandhian principles of ‘ahimsa’. Pirapaharan explained that the Tamil Tigers did not adulate or idolize violence but were forced to choose it as the ultimate course of action for the preservation of our race and identity. He felt that the people would be grateful and appreciative if India could obtain justice and fair play through peaceful methods. Nevertheless, Mr Pirapaharan went on to express serious reservations about the aims and designs of the Sinhala political leadership irrevocably enmeshed in racist ideology. We conveyed our serious reservations concerning Rajiv’s assessment of Jayawardane’s intentions. We warned that the Machiavellian mind of Jayawardane might easily mislead the inexperienced Indian Prime Minister to the detriment of the Tamils.

Narayanan patiently listened to us and said that he understood our suspicions and apprehensions. Ultimately, however, he urged us to extend our co-operation to India’s efforts to initiate a negotiated peace process.

LTTE Joins ENLF

From the assessments presented by Parthasarathy and the heads of India’s intelligence agencies on the foreign policy determinations of Rajiv’s administration, we assumed that India would soon arrange for a ceasefire and political negotiations. Jayawardane, in our calculations, would agree for a cessation of hostilities; he had nothing to lose. Firstly, for a government facing escalating violence from Tamil guerrillas, a ceasefire would have the advantage of easing the military pressure on the state’s armed forces. Secondly, the government could adopt a hard-line position during the talks and continue refusing to offer anything substantial to the Tamils. Rajiv’s peace project therefore suited Jayawardane’s crafty scheme but would have disastrous consequences for Tamil interests. We could foresee an impending conflict of interests between India’s new policy projection towards the Sri Lanka state and the aspirations of the Tamil freedom movement.

The emerging scenario posed a critical challenge. The LTTE could not face the new political reality as a separate organisation. The time had come for all the Tamil political organisations to confront the challenge as a collective force. The objective historical conditions of that juncture necessitated a united front of Tamil politico-military organisations. TELO, EPRLF and EROS had already formed an alliance in April 1984 under an umbrella organisation called the Eelam National Liberation Front (ENLF). I held the view that the best option open to the LTTE was to join the ENLF, but I had the difficult task of convincing Mr Pirapaharan of the necessity of forging a united front. I impressed upon him the need to formulate a common politico-military strategy for a united front of Tamil liberation organisations to confront the new developments and challenges arising from the fresh initiatives of the Delhi administration. I explained to him the danger of isolation and marginalisation if we stood alone. If the Tigers were to form an alliance with the ENLF the Tamil liberation movement would transform into a formidable force, an effective, powerful armour confronting the constraints of India’s assertive diplomacy. After much discussion, I succeeded in persuading the Tiger leader. With his consent I met the ENLF leaders, Mr Sri Sabaratanam (TELO), Mr Pathmanaba (EPRLF) and Mr Balakumar (EROS), and informed them of our willingness to join the ENLF. I also had extensive discussions with them concerning the formulation of a common political and military programme. Delighted to embrace the Liberation Tigers into their fold, the ENLF leaders requested a meeting with Pirapaharan to discuss the details of a common programme and to sign the ‘unity declaration’.

On 10 April 1985 a secret meeting was arranged in a hotel suite in Chennai. I accompanied Mr Pirapaharan to the location to meet the ENLF leaders. Pirapaharan knew Sri Sabaratnam from the early years of the struggle. Balakumar, the EROS leader, had previously met him at the LTTE’s political office in Indira Nagar, Adyar, Chennai. The EPRLF leader, Pathmanaba, met Mr Pirapaharan for the first time. The meeting was warm and cordial. The four leaders agreed, without reservation, on the need to chart a joint programme of action. The common political goal was to fight for the independence of the Tamil homeland based on the right to self-determination of our people. A unified military programme, Mr Pirapaharan explained, had to evolve systematically, through co-ordinated action. Until such time each organisation would carry out its own operations against the Sri Lanka armed forces. In view of India’s new diplomatic efforts to stage a negotiating process it was decided that the ENLF leaders should meet regularly and discuss developments. Finally, the four leaders signed a joint memorandum pledging to fight for the political independence of the Tamil nation.

From the very day the LTTE joined the ENLF, insurrectionary violence flared up and spread like wild fire, engulfing the Tamil nation. At 10p.m on 10 April LTTE guerrillas launched a massive assault on the well-fortified Jaffna Police Station Headquarters near the Fort military garrison. LTTE fighters took up strategic positions in front of the police station and pounded the building with rocket and mortar fire. Unable to withstand the fury of the assault, the police personnel fled to the Fort leaving behind their dead and injured. The contingent of troops who rushed to the scene of attack was beaten back by Tiger commandos. The entire police complex, including the headquarters’ building and the office of the DIGP, was completely destroyed. The Tiger guerrillas disappeared in the morning, taking with them the huge arsenal of arms and ammunition.

Following the assault on the Jaffna Police Station, each member organisation of the ENLF mounted a series of guerrilla operations on military posts, police stations and army convoys, inflicting heavy casualties on the Sri Lanka armed forces. The months of April and May 1985 recorded the worst incidents of rebel violence. As an Indian commentator puts it:

‘Sri Lanka was shaking like an aspen leaf… the spiralling violence in Tamil areas was frightening. Suddenly, coinciding with the LTTE’s joining the ENLF, all militant groups – including PLOTE which remained outside the ENLF – appeared to have found a new resolve. They were harassing the Sri Lankan forces almost throughout the length and breath of the sprawling northeast, as if they were implementing a well-drawn plan to make Colombo kneel.’¹⁰

While the Tamil guerrilla campaign escalated, causing havoc to the Sri Lanka armed forces in the Tamil homeland, the new Indian Foreign Secretary, Ramesh Bandari, made frequent visits to Colombo to secure an agreement with President Jayawardane for ceasefire and negotiations. With military pressure mounting on his security forces, Jayawardane had no alternative but to yield to India’s proposal. Nevertheless, Jayawardane agreed to negotiate with the Tamil liberation organisations, only on the conditions that India should forthwith terminate all military assistance to the Tamil rebel movements and force them to relinquish their campaign for an independent state. Having obtained a firm assurance that the Government of India would fulfil his conditions, Jayawardane consented to a ceasefire. Dates for a ceasefire and peace talks were also agreed upon during Bandari’s shuttle diplomacy. Cessation of all armed hostilities between the parties in conflict – the Sri Lankan state and the Tamil rebel movements – was to be implemented from mid-June and peace negotiations to be followed in mid- July. India and Sri Lanka agreed to hold the talks in a third country, the Himalayan Kingdom of Bhutan.

Driven by deep distrust of Jayawardane’s intentions, Pirapaharan and other ENLF leaders were of the view that a ceasefire would be militarily advantageous to the beleaguered Sinhala troops. The sustained guerrilla campaign of the Tamil resistance movement, particularly by the LTTE, would become futile if hostilities were suspended at a peak moment of escalated offensive, without realising the strategic objective of weakening the military power of the state. Pirapaharan and other leaders of the ENLF expressed their reservations and disappointments when they met Mr Chandrasekaran of the RAW at a meeting in Chennai during early June. The ceasefire would provide time and space, the militant leaders argued, for the Sinhala armed forces to re-organise, rearm and revitalize their combat capability, while the Tamil guerrilla formations would become demoralised from inactivity. Mr Chandran was not in a mood to listen. He said that enough damage had been inflicted on the Sri Lanka forces and further devastation might destabilise the state, and India would not favour such a situation. He further argued that Rajiv Gandhi and Ramesh Bandari had expended a great deal of diplomatic energy to compel Jayawardane to agree to a ceasefire and negotiations. Jayawardane’s consent to talk to militant organisations, in Chandran’s assessment, was a legitimacy given by the Sri Lanka government to Tamil rebels as authentic representatives of the people. He pleaded with the ENLF leaders to agree to the ceasefire and said the Government of India would not let down the Tamil guerrilla movement if there were any negative consequences. With great reluctance Pirapaharan and other leaders of the ENLF agreed to observe ceasefire if the Government of India ensured the good behaviour of the Sri Lanka forces. On the 18 June 1985 a cessation of hostilities between the Government of Sri Lanka and the Tamil liberation organisations was officially announced.

The ceasefire agreement comprised of four phases denoting periods of time, during which the government of Sri Lanka was obliged to take a series of actions that had to be reciprocated by the rebel organisations, leading to de-escalation and total cessation of hostilities. Mr Pirapaharan was not satisfied with certain terms and obligations of the ceasefire agreement. The absence in the agreement of guarantees and safeguards to protect Tamil civilians from violence emanating from the armed forces and armed Sinhala settlers displeased Mr Pirapaharan. Furthermore, he argued we should insist that the Government of Sri Lanka submit a concrete framework of proposals for a political settlement. I advised Pirapaharan to represent our views and concerns through the joint leadership of the ENLF. Accordingly we called an emergency meeting of the ENLF on the day the ceasefire was declared and informed the leaders of the Front of our position. There was a consensus of opinion that the ceasefire agreement had serious flaws, which should be brought to the notice of the Government of India. The Front leaders agreed with Pirapaharan’s suggestion to request the Government of Sri Lanka, through the good offices of India, to present a comprehensive framework of proposals as a basis for negotiations. This demand would preclude Jayawardane from prolonging the dialogue and evading political solutions, we contended. I agreed to a request from the ENLF leaders to formulate a joint memorandum on behalf of the Front to be forwarded to India. Mr Pirapaharan and the other ENLF leaders signed the document and it was sent to Delhi through RAW officials. Extracts from the joint memorandum stated:

‘We have carefully considered the set of proposals submitted to us by the Government of India to bring about a cessation of hostilities between Sri Lanka’s armed forces and the Freedom Fighters of our Liberation Organisations. Appreciating the mediatory role and the good offices provided by the government of India and accepting the assurances and guarantees offered to us, we, the undersigned Liberation Organisations have made a collective decision to observe ceasefire for a stipulated time to help to create a congenial atmosphere and conditions of normality and to facilitate the Government of Sri Lanka to put forward a package of concrete proposals on the acceptability of which negotiations for a permanent political solution to the Tamil national question can be commenced.

While we agree to suspend all hostilities to a limited span of time, we wish to state that certain terms and conditions outlined in the proposed framework for ceasefire, place us in a disadvantageous position. We wish to outline below some of our suggestions and counter proposals…

We propose that the Sri Lankan Government should present a comprehensive programme for a political settlement following the declaration of ceasefire… We wish to state categorically that the commencement of negotiations is conditional upon our acceptance of this political programme. We have taken this position as a consequence of a long and bitter historical experience of deceptions and betrayals by successive Sri Lankan Governments who have consistently resisted a fair and honourable settlement to the Tamil problem. It is also well known that Sri Lanka had abrogated several pacts and proposals and failed to implement agreements. We should point out that Sri Lanka also adopts an invariable practice of prolonging and postponing dialogues to evade arriving at a practical solution…. We do not wish to be victims of this futile exercise, but rather demand that a concrete set of proposals in a broad framework should be submitted to us for our consideration before deciding to participate in the process of negotiations.’¹¹

The memorandum did not receive a favourable response from the Government of India. Mr Chandrasekaran telephoned me from Delhi to express India’s displeasure. The Indian Foreign Ministry was of the opinion, he explained, that the ENLF had attempted to impose an unacceptable condition on the Government of Sri Lanka for the commencement of talks. I conveyed to Pirapaharan how the Indian government viewed the memorandum. An ENLF meeting was convened to discuss the issue and the leaders unanimously decided to stand firm on their demand that the Sri Lanka government submit a concrete set of proposals for our consideration before the commencement of talks. Subsequently I conveyed to Delhi, through Mr Chandrasekaran, the collective decision of the Front. His response to the decision was hostile and the conversation ended with a warning that all the ENLF leaders, including Mr Pirapaharan, would soon be summoned to Delhi for ‘briefing’. In my assessment, open confrontation between the Tamil liberation organisations and the Government of India seemed inevitable.

On 3 July 1985 an Indian military aircraft flew Pirapaharan and myself, along with the other ENLF leaders and their political assistants, to New Delhi where we were accommodated in a five star hotel in the heart of the city. High ranking RAWand Indian Foreign Ministry officials met us and embarked on a lengthy exposition of the difficult diplomatic exercise Ramesh Bandari had undertaken to persuade the Jayawardane regime to agree to enter into a negotiating process with the Tamil rebel organisations. It was a major diplomatic breakthrough for India as well as gaining legitimacy and international recognition for the Tamil resistance movement, a remarkable achievement, the Indian official argued. The theme of the discourse was aimed entirely at dissuading the ENLF leaders from imposing conditions for talks. The crowning episode of our visit to Delhi was the meeting with Mr Saxena at his official headquarters. In characteristic style, the RAW boss bluntly demanded the cooperation of the Tamil rebel leaders with India’s genuine efforts to resolve the Tamil ethnic conflict. He warned us that the new Indian government would not tolerate defiance and intransigence and would be compelled to withdraw protective sanctuary for the Tamil militant organisations. ‘The talks are scheduled to be held in Thimpu, the Bhutanese capital in two weeks time. The dialogue will be unconditional and if you refuse to attend neither Indian soil nor Indian territorial waters will be made available to you,’ he declared, glaring at the cheerless, sombre faces of the Tamil guerrilla leaders. Finally he urged all of us to seriously reflect on what he had said and to come out with a positive decision the next day.

We returned to the hotel and immediately went into confabulations. Pirapaharan was forthright; he had no wish to antagonise India and the ENLF should participate in the peace talks. I supported his position and without reservation the other leaders agreed. The next morning the decision of the ENLF leadership to participate in the peace talks without conditions, was conveyed to the Indian government.

The Thimpu Talks

The peace talks held in Thimpu, the Bhutan capital, comprised two rounds of negotiations. The first round started on 8 July 1985 and concluded six days later on the 13 July. H W Jayawardane, a lawyer and brother of President Jayawardane led the Sri Lanka government delegation. The remaining delegates were either legal experts or bureaucrats.

Since there was no high political representation in the Sri Lankan negotiating team, the member organisations of the ENLF decided to send senior members as their delegates. Accordingly, Lawrence Thilagar and Sivakumaran (Anton) represented the LTTE in the first round, and Yogaratnam Yogi joined the team for the second session. Varatharajaperumal and Katheswaran Loganathan represented the EPRLF. The TELO representatives for the first session were Charles and Bobby and Nadesan Satyendra also attended the discussions the second time. EROS was represented by E. Ratnasabapathy and Shankar Rajee, the two founder members from London. Representing PLOTE were Sidhartan and Vasudeva. The TULF was the exception opting to send A.Amirthalingam, Mr Sivasithamparam and R Sampanthan, its most senior leaders.

As a united front of Tamil liberation organisations the ENLF played a crucial role in the determinations of the Thimpu deliberations i.e. formulation of the agenda and procedures and the debates. The Indian government established a ‘hot line’ at a secret location in Kodambakam, Chennai to facilitate a communication link between ENLF leaders and their representatives at the venue for talks in Thimpu. Mr Pirapaharan invested me with the responsibility of guiding and monitoring the LTTE delegation and then he left for an LTTE military training camp in Salem. Everyday, until the Thimpu sessions concluded, I and the other ENLF leaders visited the hot-line location for briefings of the sessions and to advise our delegations.

The Bhutanese Government hosted the negotiations and the Foreign Minister of Bhutan, Lyonpo Tsering formally inaugurated the talks. Mr Chandrasekaran and another senior Indian official facilitated the talks. They liased with both delegations, but were not present during negotiations. With the commencement of the plenary session, the talks soon turned into verbal warfare between the parties. The Sri Lanka government delegates questioned the  legitmacy of the Tamil militant organisations and challenged their claim to be the representatives of the Tamil people. This provoked a nasty, acrimonious debate. Deeply offended by the degrading, verbal assaults, the Tamil organisations unanimously decided that all written submissions at the talks should be signed by all the participant organisations collectively as the ‘Delegation of the Tamil people’. The antagonistic and rancorous attitude of the Sinhalese delegation had the positive impact of generating the feeling of solidarity among the Tamil delegates and helped to forge a unity.

Hector Jayawardane, the head of the Sri Lanka delegation, presented a set of proposals, which were nothing other than the defunct District Development Council framework, already rejected by the TULF at the All Party Conference the year before. These proposals demonstrated the lack of seriousness on the part of the government to seek a fair and reasonable settlement. The Tamil delegations rejected the government’s proposals and refused to discuss them. Tracing the history of previous talks, agreements and betrayals by the Sinhala leadership, the Tamil delegates argued that it was the unwavering responsibility of the state to offer a meaningful solution to the ethnic conflict ‘worthy of our consideration’. The collective voice of the Tamil delegates emphasised that they could only present a guideline of basic principles upon which the government should formulate a comprehensive framework of proposals. The four cardinal principles presented by the Tamil delegation were as follows:

1. Recognition of the Tamils of Sri Lanka as a distinct nationality.

2. Recognition of an identified Tamil homeland.

3. Recognition of the inalienable right of self-determination of the Tamil nation.

4. Recognition of the right to full citizenship and other fundamental democratic rights of all Tamils.

The Thimpu Declaration enunciated as a joint statement by all Tamil delegations on the concluding day (13 July) of phase one of the Thimpu talks further stated:

‘Different countries have fashioned different systems of governments to ensure these principles. We have demanded and struggled for an independent Tamil state as the answer to this problem arising out of the denial of these basic rights of our people. The proposals put forward by the Sri Lanka Government delegation as their solution to this problem are totally unacceptable. Therefore we have rejected them …. However, in view of our earnest desire for peace, we are prepared to give consideration to any set of proposals, in keeping with the above mentioned principles that the Sri Lankan Government may place before us.’

The second round of Thimpu talks resumed on the 12 August. Hector Jayawardane read out his prepared statement, denouncing all but one of the Thimpu principles. On the principle dealing with citizenship rights he contended that the government would address the issue. Rejecting the concept of a Tamil homeland, he argued that Tamils lived all over the island and Sri Lanka was the homeland for Tamils, Sinhalese and other ethnic communities. He refused to accept the concept of Tamil nationality. Tamils, he argued, did not constitute a nation of people but a minority ethnic group. Defining self-determination as a right entitled only to nations of people under colonial rule, he out rightly rejected claims to the right to self-determination by minorities living in an independent sovereign state. In conclusion he argued:

‘If the first three principles are to be taken at their face value and given their accepted legal meaning, they are wholly unacceptable to the government. They must be rejected for the reason that they constitute a negation of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Sri Lanka, they are detrimental to a united Sri Lanka and are inimical to the interests of the several communities, ethnic and religious in our country.’

The Tamil delegates presented an extensive critique of the ‘rigid and inflexible’ attitude adopted by the Sri Lanka delegation. They argued passionately in support of the cardinal principles and reiterated that the Tamils constitute a nation of people with an identifiable homeland and, most importantly, the Tamil people have the right to self-determination. The Tamil delegation thus explained:

 ‘…our demand for self-determination had evolved and taken shape historically through the determined political struggles of our people. We stated that the Tamils of Eelam or Tamil Eelam, constituted a nation with a common heritage, a common culture, a common language, and an identified homeland and further that they were a subjugated people and as such they had the inherent right to free themselves from alien subjugation. It is the right to self-determination that has come to be recognised as one of the peremptory norms of general international law. We stated that in upholding the right to self-determination, we as a people have the liberty to determine our political status, to freely associate or integrate with an independent state or secede and establish a sovereign independent state. We mentioned, however that enumeration of the principles enunciated by us did not entail that we were opposed to any rational dialogue with the government of Sri Lanka on the basis of such principles….

The Sri Lankan Government delegation failed to engage in any discussion concerning the basic framework that we had enunciated. This was despite the circumstances that the members of the Tamil delegation specifically requested the Sri Lankan government delegation to honour that which it had stated in its own statement on 12th August i.e. to engage in a ‘fruitful exchange’ of views.

The Sri Lanka Government delegation presented instead its so-called ‘new proposals’ on 16 August 1985. These ‘new proposals’ are a rehash of the earlier proposals with the right to certain District Councils to function as Provincial Councils. The ‘new proposals’ do not recognise that the Tamils of Sri Lanka constitute a nation. The ‘new proposals’ do not recognise that the Tamil speaking people have the right to an identified homeland. The ‘new proposals’ do not recognise the inalienable right of self-determination of the Tamil people. And finally the ‘new proposals’ do not secure the fundamental rights of the Tamil people…. And accordingly the ‘new proposals’ fail to satisfy the legitimate political aspirations of the Tamil people…

The four basic principles that we have set out at the Thimpu talks as the necessary framework for any dialogue with the Sri Lankan Government are not some mere theoretical constructs. They represent the hard existential reality of the struggle of the Tamil people for their fundamental and basic rights. It is a struggle which initially manifested itself in the demand for a federal constitution in the 1950s and later in the face of continuing and increasing oppression and discrimination, found logical expression in the demand for the independent Tamil state of Eelam or Tamil Eelam…. We call upon the Sri Lankan Government to state unequivocally whether it is prepared to enter into a rational dialogue on the basis of the framework set out by the cardinal principles enunciated by us at these talks.’¹²

As both the delegations took entrenched, uncompromising positions the negotiations reached a stage of impasse. Mutual accusations of ceasefire violations further aggravated the stalemate situation. Just when the negotiating process was on the brink of collapse, Romesh Bhandari stepped in to try to save the situation. Lacking in knowledge of the historicity and complexity of the ethnic conflict and wanting in the skills of mediatory diplomacy, Bhandari blamed the Tamil delegates for their ‘inflexible attitude’. Criticising the Tamil side for being entrenched in ‘abstract principles’ he demanded counter proposals from them. Bhandari’s impervious and imprudent intervention led to a verbal clash between him and Nadesan Satyendra. Bhandari was sharply rebuked and humiliated.

While the peace negotiations were running into stormy weather in Thimpu, we in Chennai received alarming reports of mounting ceasefire violations and large-scale killings of civilians by the Sinhala armed forces in the Tamil homeland. The most serious incidents occurred in Vavuniya and Trincomalee. In Vavuniya on the 16 August scores of civilians were killed and several Tamil shops burned down when Sinhala troops went on a rampage. The following day, soldiers and armed Sinhala thugs attacked a Tamil village in Trincomalee District and massacred the civilians. These violent incidents and massacres outraged Pirapaharan. As he had anticipated, the Sri Lankan armed forces were openly flouting the ceasefire agreement. The Jayawardane government, the LTTE leader observed at the emergency meeting of the ENLF, was using the Thimpu talks as a smokescreen to cover its hideous genocidal programme. In protest the ENLF leadership decided to boycott the Thimpu talks. It was left to me to convey the message to the ENLF representatives in Thimpu to halt the talks and return to Chennai immediately. On receiving the instructions through the ‘hot line’ in Chennai all the Tamil delegations walked out of the talks after making the following statement:

‘As we have talked here in Thimpu, the genocidal intent of the Sri Lankan State has manifested itself in the continued killings of Tamils in their homelands. In the most recent incidents which have occurred during the past few days more than two hundred innocent Tamil civilians including young children, innocent of any crime other than that of being Tamils, have been killed by the Sri Lankan armed forces running amok in Vavuniya and elsewhere. It is farcical to continue peace talks at Thimpu when there is no peace and no security for the Tamil people in their homelands. We do not seek to terminate the talks at Thimpu but our participation at these peace talks has now been rendered impossible by the conduct of the Sri Lankan State which has acted in violation of the ceasefire agreements which constituted the fundamental basis for the Thimpu talks.’¹³

The collapse of the Thimpu talks was a severe blow to India’s mediatory diplomacy. Several reasons could be attributed to this failure. Firstly, India’s chief mediator Ramesh Bandari, had none of the skills of his suave and sagacious predecessor, G Parthasarthy, which were crucial for this highly sensitive and complex diplomatic task. He did not understand the very fundamentals of the ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka nor could he grasp the contradictions underlying the perceptions and attitudes between the Sinhala and Tamil nations. His impulsiveness and impatience manifested in his expectation of easy and quick solutions to difficult and complicated issues. As an Indian diplomat astutely analysing Bhandari’s mindset observed: ‘he did not quite comprehend the complexities of the attitudes of the Tamils and Sinhalese towards each other. He was also impatient about the Tamil’s insisting on their demands and aspirations… It was this impatience which found expression in his abrasive exchanges with the leaders of the Tamil delegation at Thimpu.’¹⁴ Unfortunately Delhi policy makers backed Bhandari and made decisions on his erroneous assessments. Bhandari gave the impression to Delhi that the Tamil delegates were arrogant and uncompromising.

The second reason is more unpleasant, but nevertheless not untypical of intelligence agencies’ strategy. RAW’s assertive approach towards the militants, disregarding their political sensibilities was a factor that contributed to the collapse of the Thimpu talks. Essentially the RAW operated with a master-slave attitude towards the Tamil liberation organisations. Having militarily trained, armed and provided patronage to the Tamil organisations, Indian intelligence agencies miscalculated in thinking that they could then be manipulated and controlled like puppets. The Thimpu parleys demonstrated that the Tamil rebel movements had their own political visions and were committed to policies and goals and were not malleable, even under Indian pressure and influence. The organisations were fully conscious of the significance and importance of India’s political, diplomatic and military support in their confrontation with the repressive Sri Lanka state and in the struggle for the just rights of their people. Furthermore, they had no wish to antagonise Delhi or to act in a manner prejudicial to Indian interests. Nevertheless, the aspirations of their oppressed nation and their political commitment to the people were uppermost in the ENLF leaders’ concerns and they therefore, could not be persuaded to deviate.

Before the entry of the LTTE, in RAW’s assessment, ENLF was pliable to Indian influence. Specifically, TELO under Sri Sabaratnam was India’s favourite, since unlike the pro-Marxist EPRLF and EROS, it had no ideology. When the fiercely nationalist Tamil Tigers joined the ENLF, RAW assumed, the Front became a formidable politico-military force acting and thinking independently, in relative freedom from India’s sphere of control. The Tigers friendly relations with the Chief Minister MG Ramachandran and their popularity in Tamil Nadu and Tamil Eelam, contributed to the independence and clout of the ENLF, the Indian Intelligence outfit assessed. Though heavily dependent on India’s support and sympathy, the Tamil militant organisations proudly regarded themselves as freedom fighters, not mere instruments to serve India’s scheme of things.

The Sri Lanka chief negotiator, Hector Jayawardane, adopted a hard-line, inflexible attitude, which was the third important reason for the failure of the talks. Hector represented a regime that had neither the political will nor the genuine intention of addressing the Tamil aspirations and resolving the ethnic conflict amicably. As a constitutional lawyer he always argued within the parameters of Sri Lanka’s constitution, insisting on and upholding the unitary structure of the law of the land. He was uncreative, rigid and unsympathetic to Tamil demands. As Dixit aptly puts it: ‘HW Jayawardane’s entire negotiating approach was mechanistically legal and even wooden. He kept on emphasising that responding to Tamils demands would be ultra vires of the constitution of Sri Lanka, that the unitary nature of the Sri Lanka republic cannot be eroded…. The Thimpu talks became the dialogue of the deaf’.¹⁵

The breakdown of the talks following the boycott by the Tamil delegation, we assumed correctly, would irritate Delhi. As such, we anticipated some form of punitive action.

RAW had monitored the ‘hot-line’ conversations and viewed my role in conveying the leadership decisions to the delegates at Thimpu as the reason behind the collapse of the talks. Mr Unni Krishnan, a senior RAWoperative, informed me that Delhi was displeased over my instruction to the ENLF team to boycott the talks. Subsequently, Indian punitive action was metered out to me in the form of a deportation order.

In the afternoon of 23 August 1985 the Tamil Nadu Police swooped down on my flat in Besant Nagar, Chennai and took me into custody: the following day I was deported to London on an Air India flight.¹⁶ Deportation orders were also served on Chandrahasan and Nadesan Satyendra. Sayendra had already left for London. Thus Delhi expressed its displeasure: it conveyed the message to the Tamil rebel movements that India’s benevolence was not everlasting.

Delhi’s partisan action came under heavy criticism from the Indian media. One Indian newspaper characterised it as ‘hasty and imprudent action’. The Tamil Nadu political leaders blamed Rajiv and Bhandari for being ‘insensitive to Tamil sentiments’ and organised massive protests. Pirapaharan and other leaders of the ENLF demanded my return to India and refused to participate in further negotiations until such time. These factors compelled Rajiv’s administration to revoke the deportation order and I flew back to India six weeks later.

The Bangalore Talks

In March 1986 Romesh Bhandari retired as a dejected diplomat, having failed in his mediatory mission to find a solution to the protracted ethnic conflict. AP Venkateswaran succeeded him as the Indian Foreign Secretary. Venkateswaran was neither a close confidante of Rajiv Gandhi nor was the chemistry between the two congenial. Determined to continue the mediatory effort irrespective of the earlier failures, Rajiv chose his two most trusted Ministers of State, P Chidambaram and Natwar Singh as special representatives of the Government of India to engage President Jayawardane in peace talks.

The summit meeting of the South Asian Association for Regional Co-Operation (SAARC) was to be held in Bangalore during mid November 1986 where the Prime Ministers of India and Sri Lanka were scheduled to meet. It was a major diplomatic event where Rajiv wanted to announce a breakthrough in the ethnic conflict as a significant achievement in his foreign policy towards a neighbouring country. P Chidambaram, the Minister of State for Internal Security and Natwar Singh, Minister of State for External Affairs were given the responsibility of formulating a reasonable framework of proposals to meet the political aspirations of the Tamil people.

P Chidambaram and Natwar Singh visited Colombo at the end of April 1986 and stayed for four days in the capital engaging the President and his senior Ministers, Laith Athulathmulathali, Minister of National Security, Gamini Dissanayake, Minister of Mahaveli Development, ACS Hameed Minister of Foreign Affairs. During several rounds of extensive discussions with the Sri Lanka political leaders, the Indian mediators found strong resistance and opposition in Colombo to the central demand of the Tamils for the recognition of an indentified homeland. Jayawardane and his Ministers vehemently opposed the merger of the northern and eastern provinces into a single contiguous territory.

Following the Indian Ministers’ visit, Jayawardane summoned the Political Parties Conference (PPC) in late June to deliberate on the ethnic issue. On the Tamil side only the TULF participated in the conference. The major opposition party (the SLFP), boycotted the meeting. The deliberations, which lasted nearly four months, produced a set of proposals providing limited devolution of powers to the Tamils provinces. The proposals denied fiscal powers, land rights and law and order administration to the Tamils. The core demands of the Tamils were rejected. All the Sinhala political parties participating in the conference rejected the fundamental Tamil demand for the recognition of the Tamil homeland, and the creation of a new unit, merging the north and east into a single linguistic territory for the Tamil speaking people. The PPC ended in a debacle and faced a similar destiny as its predecessor, the All Party Conference.

Jayawardane operated with a two-pronged strategy of peace and war. He continued to mislead India and the world by adopting dilatory tactics, staging one conference after the other as if he was genuinely committed to resolving the Tamil issue. Meanwhile, he entered into secret deals with Pakistan and Israel to receive substantial military assistance to build up his war machine. Furthermore, by engaging India in a peace effort he almost succeeded in blocking the military and political support Delhi gave to the Tamil liberation organisations. He created a rift between Rajiv’s administration and the Tamils by engineering the peace dialogue in such a manner as to convince Delhi that the rebel organisations were inflexible and intransigent. While generating contradictions and hostilities between the Tamils and India through peace negotiations he continued to expand and modernise the armed forces for major offensive operations to crush the Tamil freedom movement. Rajiv was unaware that the crafty old Sinhala leader was leading him up the garden path.

Compelled to present a peace package to Rajiv during the Bangalore Summit of the SAARC scheduled for 17 and 18 November 1986, President Jayawardane conceived a set of fresh proposals, which came to be known as the ‘trifurcation of the Eastern province’. It was a cleverly worked out demarcation programme by Jayawardane’s administration to dismember the eastern province on ethnic and religious grounds, aiming to negate the Tamil demand for a single, unified linguistic territory. Under this project the boundaries of Trincomalee, Batticoloa and Amparai districts would be redrawn to carve out three regions for three ethnic communities – the Tamils, Muslims and the Sinhalese – living in the eastern province. In this scheme Sinhala areas of Amparai would be de-linked and amalgamated with the Uva Province. Trincomalee city and harbour and the Sinhala settlements in Trincomalee would constitute a Sinhala region to be administered by the Sinhala government. Portions of Batticoloa and sections of Amparai predominately inhabited by Muslims would be demarcated as a Muslim region. Tamil majority areas in Trincomalee (minus the city, harbour and Sinhala settlements) and a portion of Batticoloa would be redrawn into a Tamil province. This shrewd demarcation scheme would create three provinces for the three communities, with the Sinhalese securing large swathes of territory in the east, including the strategically important Trincomalee harbour and city. The demarcated Tamil region of the East, Jayawardane envisaged, would be linked to the north. That was his response to the Tamil demand for the northeast merger. Explaining to the Indian High Commissioner, Mr Dixit the details of his trifurcation scheme, Jayawardane claimed that his ‘improved’ proposals were built on the suggestions made by Chidambaram and Natwar Singh that the Muslim and Sinhala interests in the east provinces should be ensured. He further told Dixit that he would present these ‘fresh’ proposals to Rajiv at the Bangalore summit. Dixit was not pleased:

‘I frankly told him that both the Government of India and Tamils will perceive this proposal as a way to circumvent the Tamil demand for a linkage of the northern and eastern provinces and to have this united Province acknowledged as a ‘Tamil homeland’. I expressed the fear that his Tamil protagonists would view this as a motivated tactical exercise.’¹⁷

Jayawardane and the senior ministers of his cabinet were all opposed to the Tamil demand for a homeland constituting a merged northeastern province. The aim of the Sinhala government was to dismember the east, dislocate the territorial contiguity of the Tamil region and to appropriate more Tamil land through Sinhala colonisation. Dixit’s assessment was correct: this devious demarcation plan was totally unacceptable to the Tamils. Nevertheless, Jayawardane persisted and was unprepared to modify his proposals to meet the demands of the Tamils. He planned to present this trifurcated scheme as a proposal for an interim arrangement. Though realising the inadequacies of Jayawardane’s proposal, Rajiv’s administration was determined to present it to the LTTE as a basis for negotiations at Bangalore in November 1986.

Since the breakdown of the Thimpu talks and my deportation from India in 1985 and leading up to the Bangalore summit, several pivotal events unfolded in the Tamil struggle. Crucially, the ENLF, the front of Tamil liberation organisations, disintegrated and brutal armed confrontation between two alliance members, the LTTE and TELO erupted in Jaffna in April-May 1986. The TELO leader, Sri Sabaratnam and many of his fighters were killed during the heavy fighting. The EROS leader Balakumar continued to maintain friendly relations with the LTTE leadership. The EPRLF turned hostile toward the LTTE and was forced to demobilise. Under pressure from the LTTE, the PLOTE announced that they would cease all military operations in the Tamil homeland. In other words, by the time of the SAARC Summit in Bangalore, the LTTE had emerged as the most formidable politico-military organisation, the only determining force in the Tamil freedom movement. In its mediatory efforts the Indian Government had no alternative other than to deal with the leadership of the Tamil Tigers. Knowing the extraordinary character of the LTTE leader and particularly his tough, unyielding and resolute frame of mind, the Indian establishment looked for an opportunity to chasten or rather ‘discipline’ him before planned peace talks in Bangalore. The opportunity came on 1 November, the day of the Hindu festival of lights (Deepavali) when an ugly violent incident occurred in front of the EPRLF’s political office at Choolaimedu in the heart of the city of Chennai. Douglas Devananda, a former senior cadre of the EPRLF (now a Minister in the Government of Sri Lanka) went berserk after an argument with an Indian auto rickshaw driver and indiscriminately sprayed bullets from his automatic rifle, killing a young lawyer and seriously injuring ten other civilians.

The incident caused shock and outcry in Tamil Nadu. The Indian media demanded punitive action against Tamil militant organisations operating in Tamil Nadu. Rajiv’s administration wanted the Government of Tamil Nadu to take stringent action against the militants. He advised MG Ramachandran to discipline the militants and enforce strict law and order as the SAARC Summit was soon to be held in the capital of the neighbouring state of Karnataka. In these circumstances, Mr Mohanadas, the Deputy Inspector of General Police (Intelligence) launched his ‘Operation Tiger’ to disarm the Tamil rebels. In the early hours of 8 November 1986, Tamil Nadu police swooped on the ‘safe houses’ and training camps of the LTTE and other groups, arrested the leaders and confiscated weapons.

Pirapaharan and I were arrested in our homes and taken to different police stations and subjected to humiliating treatment. We were photographed, finger printed and interrogated like common criminals. After several hours of detention we were taken back to our residences and kept under house arrest. It was a calculated move by the Indian authorities to harass, humiliate and subdue the Tamil militant leader. But in the case of Pirapaharan it worked to the contrary. The Tiger leader became angry, defiant and more determined to resist Indian intimidation and pressure. This so-called ‘Operation Tiger’ we realised, was not simply a punitive action by the police for a shooting incident at Choolaimedu in which the Tigers were, in any case, not involved. Rather, the operation constituted a grand plan worked out by the centre and state governments with the political intention of subduing the Tiger leader to make him malleable to the Indian mediatory peace strategy. We were able to fathom the undercurrent of this strategy when Pirapaharan and I were taken to Bangalore on 17 November for ‘proximity talks’ after nine days of house arrest.

An Indian Air Force plane took us from Thamparam Airbase on the outskirts of Chennai to Bangalore, where we were accommodated in the Raj Bhawan Hotel. When we arrived tired at 10p.m. a team of Indian negotiators were waiting to engage us in serious dialogue. We were introduced to Minister of State for External Affairs, Natwar Singh, the Foreign Secretary, Venkateswaran, Joint Secretary, Kuldip Sahdev and the Indian High Commissioner, Mr Dixit. They immediately proceeded to present a detailed elucidation of Jayawardane’s trifurcation scheme for the eastern province. During the deliberations we were informed that the Indian Prime Minister and the Sri Lanka President had already arrived in Bangalore and were staying at the Hotel Windsor Manor. President Jayawardane, we were told, was willing to talk to us if we accept his proposals as an interim arrangement for a specific period of time until a final settlement was reached on the ethnic conflict.

Using a detailed map of the eastern province, Mr Dixit attempted to explain to us that the trifurcation scheme would ultimately lead to the ‘unification of the Tamils in the north and east. It was an interim arrangement for a specific period, subject to further discussion and improvement,’ he said. After a lengthy exposition of Jayawardane’s proposals through the mid-night hours, the Indian High Commissioner gazed at the tired and resentful guerrilla leader and asked for his response. As I anticipated, Pirapaharan made a sharp, crisp statement. ‘The Tamil homeland is one and indivisible and we will not allow Jayawardane to dismember it,’ he declared. On hearing my translation of Pirapaharan’s comments from Tamil into English, Dixit’s face dropped. I explained to him the dangers and pitfalls behind Jayawardane’s scheme and impressed on him that neither the LTTE leadership nor the Tamil people would ever accept his proposals. Realising that Pirapaharan could not be shaken from his resolute and determinate position Mr Dixit called upon the Foreign Secretary Venkateswaran to speak to us.

Venkateswaran spoke to us in Tamil in a very polite and courteous tone, noting that we were tired and irritable. Mr Dixit, he said, had intimated to him our position on Jayawardane’s scheme. Subsequently, he did not attempt to elaborate on the proposal. He opened up the dialogue by stating that Rajiv Gandhi was earnestly concerned about the plight of the Tamils and sincerely interested in finding a reasonable solution to the ethnic conflict. Rajiv was optimistic, according to Venkateswaran, that he could persuade Jayawardane to meet the aspirations of the Tamils. The proposals presented by the government of Sri Lanka attempted to address to some level the Tamil demand for a Tamil linguistic region, in his view. It was only a provisional arrangement to be subjected to further improvement; he went on to explain. He further said that if we accepted the interim arrangement it would be a diplomatic achievement for the Indian Prime Minister. He pleaded for our co-operation to make the SAARC Summit a success for Rajiv. In conclusion, he urged us to reconsider our position and to make a positive decision. Pirapaharan was annoyed. ‘Are you requesting us to betray the cause of our people just to please Rajiv Gandhi and to promote his personal glory?’, the Tiger leader retorted angrily. Venkatewswaran got the message. He was slightly taken aback. He apologised saying that he understood our feelings. Following Venkateswaran, Natwar Singha approached us. I explained to him the negative implications of Jayawardane’s trifurcation project and reiterated our firm stand. He understood the rationality behind our position and did not make any attempt to persuade us. It was almost four o’clock in the morning when the brainstorming session ended and we were permitted to retire to our rooms.

Our firm rejection of the proposals did not deter Rajiv Gandhi from attempts to persuade us otherwise. He flew in the LTTE’s mentor and friend, Mr MG Ramachandran (MGR), the Chief Minister of Tamil Nadu. The Prime Minster assumed that MGR’s clout might convince the LTTE leader.

We met the Chief Minister the following evening in a suite at the Raj Bhawan. His aide and confidante, Tamil Nadu Minister, Panduritte Ramachandran, attended the meeting also. During an hour of engagement we were able to convince MGR of the negative implications of the Sri Lanka proposal. We explained how the trifurcation plan was in stark contradiction to the Tamil demand for a contiguous homeland and that vast stretches of land would be carved out to the benefit of the Sinhalese. MGR’s shrewd mind immediately understood the subtleties of the proposals. He lamented as to why the central government of India, particularly the Prime Minister, could not grasp the ramifications of the proposal. Appreciating our stand as rational and realistic, the Chief Minister assured us that he would not exert undue pressure on us. Thus ended the proximity talks in Bangalore.

Realising the futility of trying to wear down Pirapaharan’s resolute stand, we were finally allowed to return to Chennai. However, the Government of India was displeased with the LTTE leadership. The breakthrough so fervently anticipated by Rajiv Gandhi turned out to be another diplomatic debacle in the mediatory exercise. Jayawardane’s address at the conference added to Rajiv Gandhi’s annoyance when he used the Summit forum to lash out and condemn India’s covert assistance to ‘Tamil terrorism’ in violation of the SAARC principles of ‘non-interference and co-existence’. The Indians were severely embarrassed. This humiliation turned into hostility towards the LTTE. Delhi decided to register its deep displeasure to Pirapaharan and to impress upon him that India’s patronage should not be taken for granted. Within days of our return to Chennai, Tamil Nadu secret police under DIG Mohanadas staged a lightening raid and confiscated all the vital communication equipment from LTTE’s offices and training camps. Pirapaharan was suddenly deprived of communication with all major guerrilla bases in Tamil Eelam and he was furious with the centre and state governments of India. The Tiger leader operated his command and control structure from Chennai and the sudden severance of communication crippled him militarily. Our desperate efforts to contact MGR were of no avail. We were told that he was in Salem and could not be contacted.

Finding no other possible means of retrieving his confiscated communication equipment, Pirapaharan made a dramatic decision to fast-unto-death. No amount of pleading would change his mind: his decision was firm and irrevocable. He had an uncanny belief that his action, though risky, would succeed and he began his fastunto-death protest in my residence at Indira Nagar, Adyar, Chennai.

Soon after he started his fast I summoned a press conference to announce his non-violent protest. The Indian media gave wide publicity to the event. Some newspapers wrote critical editorials condemning both the state and central governments for penalising the Tamil Tigers to ‘placate a racist regime’. The fasting episode turned swiftly into a major political controversy. The central and state governments denied involvement in the affair, shifting the blame to the Tamil Nadu Police.

Chief Minister MGR eventually contacted me on the phone and requested me to advise Pirapaharan to give up his fasting with theassurance that he would instruct the police to handover the communication sets. The LTTE leader remained adamant, insisting on the return of the equipment before relinquishing his fast. In the meantime, my residence was engulfed with people – journalists, politicians, LTTE cadres, sympathisers, supporters and the inquisitive public.

It was, in my view, the India media and the opposition politicians who made the situation uncomfortable and embarrassing for the Tamil Nadu Chief Minister. Furthermore, he was averse to the prospect of undermining his special relationship with Pirapaharan and damaging his image as the patron of the Eelam struggle. However, what concerned him most was the serious political consequences that would have arisen had Pirapaharan continued his fast till the end. MGR was further humiliated when the Indian Minister P Chidambaram issued a statement claiming that the central government was not aware of the seizure of the LTTE’s communication equipment. Irritated by these events the Chief Minister ordered the Tamil Nadu Police to return the LTTE’’s wireless sets. Only when the police handed over the confiscated sets did Pirapaharan break off his fast of forty-eight hours.

A few days later, when Pirapaharan had sufficiently recovered, MGR invited us to meet him and we had a cordial exchange of views. As he promised during the discussions, the arms and ammunition seized from all the Tamil militant organisations (including the LTTE) were handed over to the Tigers. The Tamil Nadu Chief Minister’s unexpected move encouraged a Sinhala political analyst to speculate thus:

‘Mohanadas was not correct in stating that the arms were returned to the militants. The arms were returned only to the LTTE, which received even the arms seized from the other groups. This led many to believe that the swoop was designed by the Chief Minister to strengthen the LTTE and weaken the other groups.’¹⁸

Pirapaharan admired the exceptional qualities of MGR: his generosity, humaneness, his sensitive understanding of the plight and struggle of the Eelam Tamils and his valiant support for the armed resistance campaign of the LTTE. Nevertheless, while appreciating the extra-ordinary role and contributions made by this powerful legendary figure, the Tiger leader felt deep unease about the growing aggressive diplomacy of Rajiv’s administration. Furthermore, following the harrowing, humiliating experience at the hands of the Tamil Nadu police and the fasting episode, Mr Pirapaharan realised that he could not rely on India’s patronage forever. As an advocate of self-reliance, he deeply felt that his liberation movement would be severely constrained from charting a free and independent course of action as long as he had sanctuary on Indian soil and was exposed to Indian arm twisting diplomacy. Subsequently, Pirapaharan made arrangements to leave Tamil Nadu. In early January 1987 the Tiger leader clandestinely crossed the Palk Strait and returned home to Jaffna. He requested my wifeand I and other senior political cadres to remain in Tamil Nadu andcarry on with the political work.

Operation Liberation

1987 constituted a momentous and turbulent period of extraordinary events and violent episodes in the stormy political history of Sri Lanka. In the early months of the year, the violence of the armed forces and the counter violence of the Tiger guerrillas escalated the intensity of the conflict. The stepped up LTTE guerrilla campaign coupled with the increasing casualty rate of the government forces alarmed and agitated Jayawardane and he desperately sought ways and means to strengthen his military machine for an all-out offensive against the Tamil resistance movement. He distrusted the earnestness of the Indian mediatory effort, which, in his assessment, had failed to tame the Tigers. With the rapid growth of the military power and combat capability of the LTTE he suspected that the central government of India and the state government of Tamil Nadu were backing the Tamil Tigers, both militarily and financially. Jayawardane therefore, while giving the impression of participating in Rajiv’s mediatory efforts, solicited arms supplies and military training from Pakistan, Israel, America and China. As he strengthened his armed forces for an invasion of Jaffna, which had been brought under LTTE control, the President also imposed an economic blockade on the northern province as collective punishment against the Tamils for their support for the armed struggle. Furthermore, during this period, he expanded the Special Task Force (STF), an elite force comprising police commandos and sent senior officers to Israel and Pakistan for special training. In the early months of the year, high-ranking United States military officials from the Pacific Command visited Colombo to advise the Sri Lanka military hierarchy on counter-insurgency operations. Steadily and cautiously, Jayawardane built up his military machine in preparation for a major offensive in the Jaffna Peninsula. It came in the early hours of 26 May 1987.

A massive invasion force of eight to ten thousand troops, supported by tanks, heavy artillery and air cover unleashed a brutal assault on the Peninsula under the code name ‘Operation Liberation’. The strategic design of the first phase of the offensive was to bring the Vadamarachchi region of the Peninsula, ‘the heartland of the Tigers’ in the army’s calculation, under Sri Lanka military control. Sinhala troops moved swiftly along the coastal belt, while Sri Lanka Air Force fighter planes and naval gunboats indiscriminately pounded towns and villages. LTTE fighters tactically withdrew from Vadamarachchi and planned counter offensive guerrilla attacks once the troops moved into the interior. With Air Force and Navy support and without resistance from the LTTE, the invading troops advanced, committing heinous crimes, massacring civilians, destroying homes, temples and schools. The ancient historical coastal towns of Vadamarachchi were reduced to rubble. Within a week, the Sri Lanka army had overrun the area, hundreds of civilians were killed and thousands of Tamil youth had been rounded up. Hundreds of these young men were massacred, while others despatched to various prisons in the south of the island. The offensive was intended to inflict maximum devastation in terms of life and property and to infuse terror amongst the Tamils. Jayawardane proclaimed his sinister motives when addressing an opening ceremony of a bank in Colombo. ‘This time the fight is a fight to the finish’, he declared.

Following the fall of Vadamarachchi, the Sri Lanka armed forces prepared to invade Valigamam region of the Peninsula and Jaffna city, the cultural capital of the Eelam Tamils. Jayawardane had already given instructions to his field commanders ‘to raze Jaffna to the ground, burn the town and then rebuild it’.¹⁹ The Sri Lanka military hierarchy had briefed the President that at least ten thousand Tamil civilians would be killed if an all-out invasion was launched against the heavily populated Valigamam and the city of Jaffna. Nevertheless, Jayawardane was determined to carry out the offensive operation.

The ruthless military campaign of the Sri Lanka government alarmed Delhi. Rajiv Gandhi was shaken by the sudden outbreak of hostilities and the brutal behaviour of the Sinhala armed forces heavy casualties on Tamil civilians. The callous attitude of President Jayawardane and his disregard of an Indian warning conveyed through a diplomatic channel, further disturbed the Indian Prime Minister. In the meantime emotions ran high in Tamil Nadu over the inability and powerlessness of the central Government of India to prevent the genocidal military assault on the Tamil civilians in Sri Lanka. Tamil Nadu politicians demanded Rajiv’s intervention to prevent the starvation of the Jaffna Tamils suffering under Colombo’s economic blockade. It was in these circumstances the government of India decided to ship urgently needed relief supplies to the civilian population of Jaffna. On 3 July 1987 a flotilla of 19 trawlers loaded with 40 tones of food supplies set sail for the Jaffna Peninsula from Rameswaran in Tamil Nadu. Jayawardane was furious. He instructed the Sri Lanka Navy to intervene and block the Indian vessels carrying the supplies. Sri Lanka gunboats turned backed the flotilla after six of hours wrangling in the middle of the sea. The Sri Lanka government also issued a statement saying that the civilian population of Jaffna did not ‘require any assistance from any outside source as the Government of Sri Lanka is capable of meeting all requirements’.

Sri Lanka’s bellicose response to Indian’s humanitarian gesture irritated Delhi. Rajiv Gandhi wanted to impress upon Jayawardane that India was deadly serious in her warning that she might not hesitate to intervene, if necessary militarily, to safeguard the Tamils from genocidal onslaught. To impart to Sri Lanka such a strong message, India decided to airdrop the humanitarian relief supplies to the starving population of Jaffna. On 4 July 1987 five AN-32 transport aircraft of the Indian Air Force escorted by Mirage fighters, dropped 25 tonnes of relief supplies in Jaffna. The Sri Lanka government was warned that any attempt to interfere in the exercise would be crushed. This Indian humanitarian intervention created a strong outcry in Colombo. The Sri Lanka foreign Ministry registered a strong protest condemning the airdrop as a serious violation of its territorial integrity and an undue interference in the internal affairs of the country. The positive aspect of the airdrop was that it sent a strong message to Colombo of the danger of Indian military intervention if Sri Lanka continued its onslaught against the Tamils. Fearful of provoking Indian wrath, Jayawardane suspended his military offensive operations in Jaffna. The Sri Lanka government also agreed to allow Indian relief ships to bring urgent humanitarian supplies to the Jaffna Peninsula through Kankesanthurai harbour.

In the meantime, LTTE guerrillas had begun inflitrating back into the regions captured by the army and stepped up a counter offensive campaign. There had been several ambushes and landmine attacks on the patrolling troops in Vadamarachchi inflicting heavy casualties. The most devastating attack was launched on the night of 5 July when the LTTE, for the first time, inducted its Black Tiger suicide unit against the Sri Lanka army. Captain Miller, the first Black Tiger, drove a lorry load of explosives into the military headquarters of the Sri Lanka troops housed in Central College buildings at Nelliady and detonated the lethal cargo. The force of the explosion flattened the buildings and instantly killed hundreds of soldiers. Shaken by the event, President Jayawardane and the military hierarchy suppressed the true casualty details fearing demoralisation of the armed forces. But the Indian intelligence establishment was pleased when it learned of the high rate of casualties through their reliable sources. An Indian intelligence official told me in Chennai that as a consequence of this devastating assault, Jayawardane could be brought to the negotiating table.

The Indo-Sri Lanka Accord

India’s aggressive gesture, in violation of Sri Lanka’s airspace, and the LTTE guerrillas’ devastating counter-attack on the military headquarters, subdued Jayawardane and his hawkish Ministers and they became amenable to Indian mediatory efforts. There was intense diplomatic activity both in Colombo and in Delhi to work out a bi-lateral agreement between the Governments of India and Sri Lanka, incorporating a package of devolution to resolve the ethnic question. The Indian High Commissioner, Mr Dixit, who played a crucial role in the formulation of the Indo-Lanka Accord, devotes an entire chapter, nearly forty pages of his book, Assignment Colombo, under the title ‘Birthpangs of Accord’ describing how the Agreement was formulated. In this extra-ordinary story of the genesis of the Indo-Sri Lanka Agreement and the architects behind its creation, Mr Dixit mentions an intriguing episode. He says an LTTE representative based in Singapore conveyed a message containing a set of proposals as a basis for compromise and negotiated settlement, to Mr Ram, then editor of Hindu newspaper. The proposals included (a) secession of military operations by the Sri Lanka Army, (b) the merger of the North and East as the Tamil homeland, (c) devolution of power based on proposals discussed between 1983 and 1986, (d) Tamil should be recognised as an official and national language, (e) an interim administration should be instituted before final settlement and, (f) Tamils should be given proportional representation in the Sri Lanka armed services. According to the message received by Ram, if the above conditions were met, the LTTE would give up its demand for secession, commit itself to a ceasefire, and the agreement embodying the proposals should be signed by the Sri Lanka government and by the Government of India on behalf of the Tamils.²⁰ This message, in Mr Dixit’s rendering, was conveyed to Ram over the telephone when he was in Singapore on his way to China. Ram passed the message to the Sri Lanka government through his friend Gamini Dissanayake, the then Minister of Lands and Mahaveli Development, says Dixit.

According to the former Indian High Commissioner the draft framework of the Indo-Lanka Agreement was formulated through intense discussions and mutual consultations between Delhi and Colombo, based on the alleged LTTE proposals. The crucial question is, did the LTTE present a set of proposals or demands as a compromise formula? Is there any truth in the reported story of an anonymous person operating in Singapore as the representative of the LTTE conveying a framework of proposals to an Indian journalist through the telephone? For the purpose of documenting the true history of the Tamil people’s struggle it is crucial that I set the record straight on the authenticity of this intriguing story. I have to state, categorically, that the LTTE was not in anyway involved in this incredulous episode. I was closely associated with Pirapaharan in all matters pertaining to Indo-LTTE affairs, particularly the peace negotiations, and I can say with certainty that the LTTE leadership was not even aware of this alleged transmission of a message claiming to contain proposals from our liberation organisation. If such a transmission of ideas had taken place, why is it that they were never mentioned in our discussions on the Accord when Pirapaharan and I met Rajiv Gandhi prior to the signing of the Agreement? Furthermore, Mr Dixit and Mr Ram are experienced professionals who are well aware of the necessity of checking sources, particularly telephone messages. One would have expected either Mr Ram or Mr Dixit, or both, to clarify the authenticity of the telephone message with the LTTE leaders, if they considered the contents important enough to form the basis for the working out of a settlement to the ethnic issue and for a bi-lateral agreement between states. Crucially, however, it is the content of the proposals, which raises questions as to the credibility of the story. Anybody familiar with or engaged in relations with the LTTE would immediately question the content of the ideas. Some of the proposals attributed to the LTTE are totally incompatible with its principles and policies. Most importantly, there is a deliberate omission of the cardinal principle of the right to self-determination in the alleged LTTE proposals. All this points to the likelihood of a planted story by interested parties, particularly the Indian intelligence agencies, to gain a breakthrough in the stagnated peace process and to reach a bi-lateral agreement with Sri Lanka.²¹

The Indo-Lanka Accord was a joint product of the Governments of India and Sri Lanka. It was formulated and finalised through deliberations between representatives of Rajiv’s and Jayawardane’s administrations. Neither the Tamil nor the Sinhalese public was involved. It was neither discussed in the Indian Parliament nor in the Sri Lanka Parliament. How the LTTE leadership was introduced to this crucial Agreement that affected the political destiny of the Tamil people is a bizarre story.

On 19 July 1987 Mr Hardeep Puri, First Secretary (Political) at the Indian High Commission in Colombo paid a sudden visit to Jaffna and requested a meeting with the LTTE leader. Pirapaharan, accompanied by Yogaratnam Yogi, met the Indian delegate. Without specifying any details, Mr Puri informed the Tiger leader that a package of proposals had been formulated between the governments of Sri Lanka and India and that the Indian Prime Minister wished to meet Pirapaharan in Delhi to clarify and explain matters. When Pirapaharan and Yogi asked for a further elaboration of the proposals, the Indian diplomat refused to comment and said that all matters would be clarified in Delhi. Realising that the matter was urgent and extremely important and not wishing to reject the invitation of the Indian Prime Minister, Pirapaharan agreed to go to Delhi. The Tiger leader insisted that I, as his political advisor resident in Chennai at the time, should also accompany him.

On July 23 two Indian military helicopters landed on the grounds of Suthumalai Aman Temple near Jaffna, picked up the LTTE delegation comprising of Pirapaharan, Yogaratnam Yogi and Thileepan and flew to Meenambakam Airport. In the meantime the Tamil Nadu Police informed me of their arrival and I was taken to the airport to meet them. At the airport Pirapaharan informed me that the Indian Prime Minister had invited them to discuss the details of a framework of proposals, about which he had no knowledge. Puri was tongue-tied when I asked him about the new set of ideas. His only commented that the Indian High Commissioner would explain the details in Delhi. We later boarded an Indian Air Force plane and arrived in the Indian capital a few hours later.

From the airport we were taken to the Ashok Hotel in the heart of the city. As our vehicles entered the gates of the prestigious hotel we noticed black uniformed Indian military commandos (Black Cats) in large numbers guarding the hotel premises. Noticing a sense of curiosity and concern on our faces, Mr Puri told us that for our protection the hotel had been placed under tight security. The entire top floor of the hotel, including a suite, was allocated to us and well-armed Black Cats had taken up positions in front of our rooms. At the hotel a RAWofficer informed us that we were placed under safe custody and we could not leave the hotel or allow anybody in. The telephones on our floor were also disconnected, he said. To our amazement we realised that under the guise of ‘safe custody’ the Indian government had placed us incommunicado, surrounded by an elite force of Black Cats. Pirapaharan confided to me: ‘Bala Anna, I’m trapped again’.

Soon after we arrived at the hotel, Mr Dixit visited us. His face was grim and serious. Sitting on the sofa in the suite, he pulled out his pipe, lit it and puffed out the smoke a couple of times. Seated in front of him, we watched him attentively, anticipating clarifications. ‘A bi-lateral agreement has been reached between the Governments of India and Sri Lanka. The Indian Prime Minister, Mr Rajiv Gandhi will visit Colombo soon to sign the agreement. This agreement offers a fair and reasonable solution to the Tamil ethnic question. You should accept this agreement,’ Mr Dixit declared. He took a copy of the Agreement out of his pocket and handed it to me. ‘Please translate this document for Mr Pirapaharan. I’ll be back in two hours time. I hope you’ll be ready with a positive response by then,’ he told me. Having said that, he got up and briskly walked out of the room.

I translated the document into Tamil and explained the implications of the proposals. We found the proposals in the Agreement limited and inadequate and some provisions vague and ambiguous. While emphasising a pluralist structure of Sri Lanka society, the Agreement recognises the distinct ‘cultural and linguistic’ identity of various ethnic groups thereby rejecting the conceptualisation of nation and nationality. While ensuring Sri Lanka’s ‘unity, sovereignty and territorial integrity’ the Agreement recommends a solution within the unitary constitution. The only positive element in the proposals was the recognition of the northern and eastern provinces as ‘areas of historical habitation of the Sri Lankan Tamil speaking peoples…’ The cardinal feature of the Agreement was merger of the northern and eastern provinces into a single administrative unit. But the merger itself was interim to be subjected to a referendum allowing the ethnic communities in the east to decide over a permanent link with the north. The Agreement allows for the formation of a temporary Northeast Provincial Council with a Governor, Chief Minister and Board of Ministers. The powers and functions of the Provincial Council were not specified. Rather a set of proposals negotiated between 4 May 1986 and 19 December 1986 between the governments of Sri Lanka and India and the TULF leaders were recommended as the basis for settlement. ‘Residual matter not finalised during these above negotiations shall be resolved between Indian and Sri Lanka within a period of six weeks of signing the Agreement.’ It should be noted that these proposals called the December 19th Framework were criticised and rejected by the LTTE in the written response submitted to the Government of India in January 1987. The Agreement, therefore, fails to deal with any core issues critical to the Tamil question. The most important aspect that affected the LTTE was the issue on decommissioning. The Agreement stipulated that all Tamil militant organisations should be disarmed within 72 hours of the signing of the Accord. Pirapaharan’s face turned red when I translated this particular clause. Within the time frame of two hours allocated to us Pirapaharan made a firm, resolute decision. He resolved not to accept the Indo-Lanka Accord under any circumstances.

Two hours later Mr Dixit returned. He enquired as to whether we had made our decision. We told him in precise terms that we could not accept the Agreement. He demanded an explanation. I pointed out the limitations in the proposals, arguing that they fell far short of Tamil aspirations. The framework proposed in the Agreement was totally unacceptable to the LTTE, I said. Pirapaharan argued that it was unfair and unreasonable on the part of the government of India to disarm the Tamil freedom movement before reaching a permanent political solution with guarantees security to our people. ‘How can India ask us to give up our arms within 72 hours. These weapons were captured from the enemy forces with enormous sacrifices over the last 15 years of bloody armed struggle,’ he said, raising his voice in anger.

Mr Dixit dismissed our criticisms as invalid and argued that the provincial framework was the best the Tamils could ever hope for. He said there was no need for weapons since a permanent ceasefire would come into being and an Indian peace keeping force would maintain peace. He pleaded with us to trust the Indian government and to reconsider our decision. We stuck to our position arguing that we could not trust Jayawardane and the Sinhala armed forces.

Dixit became impatient and resentful. ‘Whether you accept it or not this Agreement will be signed. This is a bi-lateral Agreement between two countries. You’ll face far-reaching consequences if your oppose it,’ he threatened.

‘Can you tell us what sort of consequences we’ll have to face,’ asked Yogi.

‘You’ll be in our custody here in India until you accept the Accord,’ he said.

‘Even if you keep us in custody for a long time, even for years, we’ll never accept this Agreement and hand-over our weapons,’ Pirapaharan replied angrily.

He stared at Pirapaharan and shouted, ‘If you refuse to lay down your weapons we’ll seize them by force, with the help of the Indian army. Your fighters are non-entities in front of the mighty Indian army.’ Brandishing his pipe at Pirapaharan he went on, ‘In the time it takes to light this pipe and finish smoking it, the Indian army will wipe out your fighters.’

Pirapaharan smiled cynically. ‘You can do whatever you like, but we’ll never accept this Agreement, under any circumstances,’ he said.

Dixit was enraged: his lips trembled in anger. ‘Mr Pirapaharan, this is the forth time you have cheated India,’ he said.

‘That means I have saved my people four times,’ Pirapaharan retorted.

Unable to tolerate any more, the ill-tempered diplomat got up and walked away.

Having realised that the aggressive diplomatic approach would not dislodge Pirapaharan’s firm resolve, Indian officials adopted the method of friendly, cordial persuasion. MK Narayanan, the Director of India’s Intelligence Bureau (IB), Shahadev, Joint Secretary of the Foreign Ministry, Nihil Seth of the Foreign Ministry, Hardeep Puri of the Indian High Commission in Colombo, visited us one by one, explaining the contents of the devolution package. When we pointed out the inadequacies and pitfalls they assured us that these issues could be discussed and impoved upon later. They insisted that the LTTE’s approval of the Accord was crucial before Rajiv signed the Agreement in Colombo. Despite the mounting pressure and attempts at persuasion, Pirapaharan did not yield. He maintained an iron resolve. Finally, it was decided to solicit the help MG Ramachandran, the Tamil Nadu Chief Minister.

MGR arrived in Delhi on 26 July. That evening Pirapaharan, Yogi and I were taken to Tamil Nadu House in the city to meet the Chief Minister. Tamil Nadu Food Minister, Panduritti Ramachandran and Mr Dixit were present with MGR when we entered his chamber. When we were seated and the formalities dispensed with, Dixit continued his exposition of the Agreement. He tried to impress upon the Tamil Nadu leaders that Sinhala hardliners had been pressurised into accepting the merger of the Tamil regions into a Tamil linguistic state, a unified homeland. This was a remarkable achievement for which the Tamil people as a whole should be grateful to the government of India, he argued. Pointing an accusing finger at us, Mr Dixit charged, ‘All the Tamil political organisations, the TULF and the militant groups have accepted the Indo-Sri Lanka Agreement, except these gentlemen here. They’ll never accept anything however reasonable it maybe other than a separate state of Tamil Eelam. But the Government of India will never allow the formation of an independent Tamil state in Sri Lanka. They’ll have to face serious consequences if they antagonise India by opposing this Agreement.’

Resting his check on the palm of his right hand, MGR listened patiently.

Yogi intervened. ‘There is nothing substantial in the Provincial Council scheme. This framework fails to address the aspirations of the Tamil people. The merger of the northeast provinces is a temporary arrangement subjected to referendum. If a referendum takes place and the Sinhalese and Muslims are against merger, the Tamil homeland will be permanently bifurcated. With all these pitfalls we can’t accept this Agreement,’ he declared.

This intervention ignited a heated argument between Yogaratnam and Dixit.

‘Mr Puri met you in Jaffna last week and explained the contents of the agreement. At that time you endorsed the Agreement. Now you’re opposing it. I can’t understand you,’ Dixit said.

Yogaratnam denied that there was discussion on the Agreement in Jaffna.

‘So, are you calling me a liar?’ Dixit blurted out.

‘What I am saying is that you are not telling the truth,’ replied Yogaratnam.

The Chief Minister could see that the discussion between the two was becoming acrimonious and bitter. He politely requested the Indian Envoy to allow him to talk to the LTTE delegation in private. Reluctantly, Mr Dixit left the room.

MGR enquired from us as to why we were opposed to the Indo-Sri Lanka Agreement. We presented an elaborate critique of the framework of the political settlement envisaged in the Agreement. We explained the defects and limitations of the Provincial scheme arguing that it falls short of Tamil aspirations. The Tamil political parties and militant organisations had capitulated to the pressure and intimidation of the Government of India. We were not prepared to betray the cause of our people under threat or intimidation, we declared. We tried to convince the chief Minister that it was unfair and unreasonable on the part of the Indian government to demand the disarming and surrender of our freedom fighters when the Tamil nation was occupied by enemy forces and when the Tamil national question was not resolved permanently. Having patiently listened to us, MGR was able to grasp the implications of our arguments. He told us that he understood our position. Appreciating Pirapaharan’s unwavering resolve, he assured the Tiger leader that he would support his decision. We were pleased and relieved when we left his chamber. As we were coming out of Tamil Nadu House, Mr Dixit met us in the corridor.

‘Did the Chief Minister ask you to accept the Agreement?’ he enquired. We kept a calculated silence. ‘Please do what he has requested you to do,’ he pleaded. We replied in the affirmative.

The Indian Prime Minister was told that the Tamil Nadu Chief Minister could not persuade Pirapaharan to accept the Indo-Sri Lanka Agreement. Rajiv was disappointed and embarrassed. Nevertheless he was firmly determined to get the support of the LTTE leadership before visiting Colombo to sign the Accord. He decided to listen to our views and make a personal attempt to convince Pirapaharan.

Midnight 28 July, Pirapaharan and I were suddenly roused from our sleep by the Indian intelligence officers and told that the Prime Minister wanted to meet us urgently. We were taken to the Prime Minister’s residence in a convoy of heavily armed Black Cat commandos. Rajiv Gandhi, attired in pure white national dress, received us at the entrance of his house with a charming smile. ‘I have heard a lot about you. It’s a pleasure to see you in person,’ he said, shaking the LTTE leader’s hand. He took us to his chamber. M K Narayanan, the IB chief and the Tamil Nadu Minster, Panduritti Ramachandran were waiting to meet us.

The Prime Minister initiated the dialogue, enquiring from us, very courteously, as to why we disapprove of the Indo-Sri Lanka Accord. Pirapaharan requested me to clarify and explain our position. I started with critique of the Sri Lanka constitution arguing that any meaningful sharing of power between the centre and the regions would not be possible under this majoritarian constitution with entrenched provisions.

The constitution entrenched a unitary authoritarian state with a powerful presidency in which power is concentrated in the centre. Therefore, the constitution would constrain meaningful distribution of power. The major flaw in the Indo-Sri Lanka Agreement, I argued, was that it upheld the unitary nature of the Sri Lanka state thereby closing the space for fundamental changes in the political system.

The Indo-Lanka Accord on which the Provincial Council scheme was outlined, failed to clearly define the powers, functions and subjects of the envisaged institutional arrangement, I said. The December 19th framework of proposals which the Accord recommended should be the basis for further improvement, I pointed out, had already been rejected by the LTTE as limited and inadequate.

Arguing that the recognition of the Tamil homeland was an issue of paramount importance to the Tamil speaking people, I said that the merger of the northeastern provinces into a single administrative unit was a positive achievement. Yet, it was a temporary linkage and subjecting the final decision to a referendum was totally unacceptable to us, because a negative result in the referendum would permanently bifurcate the northeast and dismember the Tamil homeland, I explained.

Finally, I took up the issue of disarming of the Tamil Tiger guerrillas.

I argued passionately against decommissioning the freedom fighters before a permanent settlement to the ethnic conflict, before adequate guarantees were secured for the safety of the Tamil people.

Without interruption, the Prime Minister listened patiently to our views and arguments jotting down a few points in his diary. He said that he understood our concerns. He explained that the Provincial Council scheme envisaged in the Agreement was a temporary arrangement subject to further discussions and improvements. ‘We have to proceed stage by stage. It is very difficult to get everything at once. With great effort, we have secured regional autonomy for the Tamils in a united province. This represents a major advance,’ Rajiv explained.

He said there were defects and flaws in the Agreement. Referring to our critique of the referendum on merger, the Prime Minister assured us that he could persuade Jayawardane not to hold a referendum. ‘You must trust the Government of India. We’re genuinely committed to promote the interests of your people,’ Rajiv said. He further said that co-operation and support of the LTTE leadership was crucial for the implementation of the Accord. At this stage Mr Panduritte Ramachandran intervened. He gave an exposition to Pirapaharan in Tamil of what Rajiv was saying. The Tiger leader was not impressed. ‘This Agreement doesn’t enhance the interests of our people. On the contrary, it seriously undermines their interests and aspirations. Therefore, we can’t accept this Agreement,’ Pirapaharan pointed out. Mr Ramachandran promptly translated Pirapaharan’s statement. Realising that the Tiger leader could not be persuaded to accept the Agreement, Rajiv adopted a different strategy.

‘We understand your position. We’re not asking you to reverse your decision or change your policy. You need not accept the Agreement. What we’re suggesting is that you shouldn’t oppose it,’ Rajiv commented.

The Tamil Nadu Minister interpreted the Prime Minister’s statement more artfully. ‘Is it not a wonderful turn. The Prime Minister himself accepts your position. You need not accept the Accord. But don’t oppose it. At least you can do this small favour for the government of India,’ Ramachandran pleaded.

Rajiv Gandhi continued, ‘We are aware of the fact that your organisation as well as your people do not trust President Jayawardane. Personally I don’t trust him either. Yet we have extracted major concessions from him and formulated this Accord by exerting heavy pressure. There may be defects in the Provincial Council scheme. Nevertheless we can negotiate and improve upon it enhancing the powers of regional autonomy. You should realise that it will be impossible to implement the Provincial scheme immediately. It will take a long time. During that period we can setup an interim government in the northeast in which your organisation can play a predominate role. I am prepared to enter into a secret agreement with you regarding the formation of an interim government in the Tamil region,’ he said.

Minister Ramachandran became excited and enthusiastic. He pleaded with us not to reject, in his view, this wonderful opportunity, a rare chance to set-up an LTTE administrative rule in the Tamil homeland. ‘Don’t worry about the Indo-Sri Lanka Accord. Before that there’s going to be a Rajiv-Pirapa Pact. We can formulate this pact secretly, without public proclamation,’ he exclaimed.

Pirapaharan was deeply buried in thought. I felt that he did not believe in pledges and secret pacts. But Panduritte Ramachandran was deadly serious. He was attempting to give a form and structure to the northeast interim administration conceived under ‘Rajiv-Pirapa Pact’. Having agreed to give a dominant role to the LTTE in the interim administrative authority, Rajiv suggested representation from all organisations. Pirapaharan was only agreeable to limited representation to the TULF and EROS. The Prime Minister assured us that he would negotiate with the Jayawardane government on the structure, composition, powers and functions of the northeast interim government.

In view of the complaints made by Sri Lanka government, Rajiv Gandhi enquired from Pirapaharan whether he could terminate the system of taxation in Jaffna. The LTTE leader said that funds collected in the form of taxes were utilised for the administration of the organisation. If the Government of India provided funds, Pirapaharan assured Rajiv that he would stop the taxation. The Prime Minister pledged to pay five million rupees monthly, in Indian currency, to meet the LTTE’s administrative expenses.

Next the critical question of disarming the Tamil fighters was taken up for discussion. The Prime Minister assured Pirapaharan that is organisation need not surrender all the weapons or disband his guerrilla army. A symbolic surrender of a few weapons would be sufficient to convince Sri Lanka and the international community that the LTTE was abiding by the obligations of the Agreement, he said. He further asserted that the Indian Peace Keeping force would enforce a ceasefire and protect the fighters and civilians. Under these conditions there would not be any necessity for weapons, he pointed out. Pirapharan was reflecting seriously. ‘What is there to think about?’ Mr Ramachandran intruded. ‘Hand over a few old, defective weapons you received from India,’ he told Pirapaharan.

‘All the weapons we received from India are old and rusty and unusable,’ the Tiger leader retorted.

‘Hand over those useless arms and ask for new ones from India later on,’ the Minister said.

Rajiv was curious to hear the content of the conversation that was going on in Tamil. Mr Ramachandran rendered the translation of the dialogue in English. Rajiv smiled approvingly.

It was two o’clock in the morning. The Prime Minster looked cheerful and in good spirits. He must have been pleased for having arrived at some compromise with the LTTE leader. He had to take an early morning flight to Colombo and the signing of the Accord was scheduled for the afternoon.

Gratified with his performance and delighted to have arbitrated a clandestine agreement between the two leaders, Mr Ramachandran appeared pleased with himself. Pirapaharan was reflective and sullen. There was sadness in his eyes.

As the Prime Minister had made pledges on several issues, including an LTTE controlled interim administrative authority, I asked Panduritte Ramachandran, as the meeting drew to a conclusion, whether this Rajiv-Pirapa Pact should be recorded in writing and signed by both leaders. This suggestion momentarily jolted Ramachandran. The smile vanished form his face. He pondered a while and then said, ‘We’ve agreed on matters of extreme controversy. It involves the supply of black money and a clandestine agreement on weapons. If these matters come to light it’d create a political storm in India and Sri Lanka. Don’t you trust our Prime Minister? Let us take this as a gentlemen’s agreement, an agreement between two honourable men.’

‘Please don’t worry. I’ll definitely fulfil my pledges. Let’s treat this as a gentlemen’s agreement, as the Minister correctly characterised,’ Rajiv Gandhi said.

Pirapaharan showed no interest in a written agreement. He told me later that he did not believe the Government of Indian would implement the pact, written or unwritten. As we were about to leave I requested the Prime Minster to remove restrictions on us and permit the LTTE delegates to return to Jaffna, for which he agreed.

We returned to our rooms in the hotel thoroughly exhausted. Thileepan, who shared a room with me, would not let me sleep. He was asking all the details about the meeting and particularly about the secret pact and pledges. Finally he asked, ‘What does Anna (Pirapaharan) think about it?’ I told him that Pirapaharan was not happy and did not believe that the pledges would be fulfilled. ‘Anna’s prediction will definitely come true,’ he said with conviction.

The Indian Prime Minister flew to Colombo as scheduled and at a grand ceremony in the afternoon Rajiv Gandhi and Jayawardane signed the Indo-Sri Lanka Agreement. Freed from all restrictions we returned to Chennai. On the 2 August Pirapaharan, Yogi and Thileepan were flown to Jaffna in an Indian military aircraft.

‘We Love India’ Speech

Following the signing of the Indo-Sri Lanka Agreement, thousands of Indian troops with heavy weapons – tanks, artillery pieces, heavy mortars and machine guns – began to pour into Jaffna through the Palali Air Base. As the Sinhala armed forces were confined to barracks in accordance with the obligations of the Accord, Indian Peace Keeping troops, including Tamil speaking soldiers of the Madras Regiment, marched along the streets of Jaffna. The Tamil civilian population, who historically viewed India as their guardian, ally and friend, garlanded and welcomed the Indian army with joy, as if permanent peace had been established. While there was jubilation and hope amongst the Tamil people, the Sinhala south turned hostile against India, launching mass protests and demonstrations. The Marxist radicals of the Janatha Vimukthi Perumuna (JVP) spearheaded violent protest campaigns accusing the Indian government of blatant intervention in the internal affairs of Sri Lanka.

With this unprecedented turn of events and the signing of the Indo-Sri Lanka Accord, the LTTE leadership was faced with the dilemma of explaining to the Tamil public, as well as its members, the policy decisions of the organisation. This was done on 4 August 1987 when the LTTE leader made his famous speech at Suthumalai. A crowd of over one hundred thousand people assembled in the grounds of Suthamalai Amman temple to listen to Pirapaharan spell out the future course of the Tamil freedom movement and its relations with India. The Tiger leader delivered the following historical speech in Tamil as the multitude listened in rapt attention:

‘My Beloved and Esteemed People of Tamil Eelam,

‘Today, a turning point of immense significance has taken place in the history of our struggle. This turn of events occurred so suddenly that it stunned us as if it has happened beyond our powers. We have to wait and see whether the consequences of this turn of events will be favourable to us or not.

‘You are aware that this Agreement, concluded suddenly in haste between India and Sri Lanka, without consulting us as the representatives of our people, is being implemented with expedition and urgency. I was not aware of this Agreement until I reached Delhi. Having convinced me that the Indian Prime Minister desired to meet me, I was taken to Delhi in a hurry. The Agreement was shown to us when we reached Delhi. There are a lot of flaws and defects in the Agreement. We doubt whether the Agreement will bring a permanent settlement to the problems of our people. Therefore, we explained to the Government of India, in clear terms, that we cannot accept this Agreement. But the Indian government was firmly determined to implement the Agreement whether we opposed or not.

‘We are not surprised over the position of the Indian government. The Agreement is not primarily concerned about the Tamil question. It is essentially a bi-lateral Agreement concerned with Indo-Sri Lanka relations. There are obligations in the Agreement that binds Sri Lanka to India’s geo-strategic sphere of influence. It prevents the penetration into Sri Lanka external subversive forces inimical to Indian interests. It is for this reason India showed extraordinary interest in the Agreement. At the same time, this Agreement contains elements that determine the political destiny of the Eelam Tamils. That is why we are strongly opposed to the Agreement since it was concluded without taking into consideration our views and the opinion of our people. But our protests are meaningless. When a mighty super-power has determined to decide the political destiny of our people it is beyond our ability to do anything.

‘The Agreement directly affects the political projects of our liberation organisation; it affects the mode of our struggle; it attempts to put an end to our armed struggle. The mode of our heroic struggle, fought for the last 15 years and built on the blood and sacrifice of our fighters, is to be dismantled in a few days time. This, we cannot digest. This Agreement suddenly disarms us, without providing adequate time, without getting the consent of our fighters, without offering guarantees for the safety and security of out people. Therefore, we refused to lay down arms.

‘It was in these circumstances the Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi, invited me for a discussion. I spoke to him frankly about our problems. I confided to the Indian Prime Minster that I do not repose the slightest trust in the Sinhala racist state nor do I believe that the Sinhalese will implement the Agreement. I spoke to him about the issue of security of our people and the guarantees for their safety. The Indian Prime Minister has given me certain pledges. He has offered to guarantee the security of our people. I trust his sincerity. I have faith in his assurances. We trust that the Government of India will not allow the Sinhala racist state to resume genocidal violence against our people. It is because of this trust we have decided to lay down our weapons to the Indian Peace Keeping force.

‘I need not elaborate here the immense sacrifices we have made for the protection of our people. Our people are fully aware of the nature and character of our deep devotion and commitment to the cause. The weapons that we took up and deployed for your safety and protection, for your liberation, for your emancipation, we now entrust to the Indian government. From the very moment we handover our weapons we hand over the responsibility of protecting our people to India. In receiving our weapons from us – the only means of protection for the Eelam Tamils – the Indian government takes over from us the tremendous responsibility of protecting our people. The handing over of arms signifies the handing over, or rather the transfer of this responsibility. Were we not to hand over our weapons we would be placed in a perilous situation of clashing with the Indian army. We do not want that. We love India. We love the people of India. We are not prepared to deploy our arms against Indian soldiers. The soldiers of the Indian army are taking the responsibility of safeguarding and protecting us against our enemy. I wish to emphasise that by the virtue of our handing over our weapons, the Indian government should assume full responsibility for the life and security of every one of the Eelam Tamils.

‘My beloved people, we have no alternative other than to co-operate with this Indian endeavour. Let us offer them this opportunity. However, I do not think that this Agreement will bring a permanent solution to the Tamil question. The time is not far off when the monster of Sinhala racism will devour this Agreement.

‘I have an unshakable faith that only an independent state of Tamil Eelam will provide a permanent solution to the problem of the Tamil Eelam people. Let me make it absolutely clear to you that I will continue to struggle for the cause of Tamil Eelam. The forms and modes of struggle may change but the goal of our struggle will never change. If our cause is to triumph we should have the whole – hearted support of our people. Circumstances might arise for our liberation organisation to participate in the interim government, or in the election for the sake of promoting the interests of our people. But I wish to declare, firmly, that under no circumstances and at any point in time will I ever contest the elections or accept the office of Chief Minister.’

The LTTE leader’s speech, popularly labelled as the ‘We love India speech’, received wide publicity in the Sri Lankan and Indian media and gained global coverage. Some of the Indian newspapers complimented the speech as a cautiously crafted statement, a balancing act, to wriggle through the opposite tendencies of contradiction between India’s geo-political interests and Tamil aspirations for political independence. The contents of the speech betrayed the agony of Pirapaharan, torn between love for India and its people and hatred for the Sri Lanka racist state, commented a newspaper.

As pledged by Pirapaharan at Suthamalai, the LTTE handed over a reasonable quantity of arms and ammunition to the IPKF on the following day, 5 August. The ceremony took place at Palali Air Base where over one hundred journalists and photographers, Sri Lankan, Indian and foreign, were invited to give maximum publicity to the decommissioning of the Tamil Tiger guerrillas. An Indian journalist observed that ‘the LTTE handed over two van loads of mostly obsolete weapons to the IPKF’, most of them received from India. General Sepala Attygalle, the Defense Secretary, represented the President of Sri Lanka at the ceremony. Senior commanders of the IPKF, General Depinder Singh and General Harkirat Singh participated on behalf of the Indian government. Several high-ranking officials of the IPKF and the Sri Lanka armed forces were present. Yogaratnam Yogi, represented the LTTE. He was supposed to handover a German Mauser pistol to General Attygalle as a ‘symbol of surrender’, during the ceremony. A proud young political leader, Yogaratnam detested the role. He reluctantly attended the function, looking stern and grim and maintained a defiant silence. As the function started, to everyone’s surprise Yogaratnam suddenly got up and placed the pistol on the table, depriving the media men of the symbolic scenario of surrender. Later, Pirapaharan complimented him. Severely embarrassed, General Attygalle placed his palm on the pistol and read out his brief statement: ‘Today is a historic day for the future of Sri Lanka…This act of surrendering all arms signifies an end to the bloodshed and violence that has affected the entire fabric of our democratic society.’ In fact, the LTTE did not surrender all the weapons. The IPKF High Command was informed that the remaining arms would be handed over once the interim administrative authority was institutionalised under the control of the LTTE.

Why the Accord Failed

Having surrendered a portion of its weapons to the Indian Army as a symbolic gesture of co-operation, as Rajiv Gandhi suggested, the LTTE leadership awaited in anticipation that Delhi would initiate steps to set-up the interim administrative authority. There were no initiatives from the Government of India. In the meantime, the Sri Lanka government opened up new police stations in the northeast, consolidating the state’s law and order machinery in the Tamil homeland. The Sinhala colonisation schemes in Tamil areas intensified, with the backing of the government. The funds assured by the Indian Prime Minister for the administration of the LTTE’s structures was discontinued after one month’s instalment. The issue that deeply disturbed the LTTE leadership was the arrival in Tamil Eelam from India of a large number of armed cadres from the EPRLF, PLOTE and TELO. They were freshly trained and armed by RAW, according to confessions from some of these young fighters arrested by the LTTE. While clandestine boat landings of EPRLF and PLOTE members took place on the east coast at night, TELO cadres occupied some coastal villages in Mannar. The penetration of these armed groups hostile to the LTTE posed a serious threat to the security of the Tamil Tigers. There were attacks in which the LTTE suffered casualties. The IPKF refused to take action when the matter was brought to their attention. As time passed in a political vacuum, Pirapaharan became agitated and frustrated. Thileepan, a popular political leader in Jaffna and a person well acquainted with the pledges given by the Indian Prime Minister in the form of a gentlemen’s agreement, undertook a fastunto-death to mobilise public protest against India’s failure to fulfil its assurances.

Thileepan’s fast and his martyrdom is well documented and extensively treated in Adele Balasingham’s work, The Will to Freedom. It suffices to say that Thileepan’s courageous act of selfsacrifice inspired, mobilised and unified the entire Tamil nation as a collective force to protest against India’s inaction. When Pirapaharan and I met Mr Dixit at the IPKF Headquarters at Palali, Thileepan was on the threshold of death. We pleaded with the Indian envoy to visit the young fighter and assure him that India would fulfil the pledges given to the LTTE and request him to break his fast. Dixit rejected our genuine plea fearing that there was a conspiracy behind our invitation. On this issue he writes:

‘IPKF and our intelligence sources had informed me that the plan was to take me to Thileepan at the Nallur Kandaswamy Temple, subject me to a massive anti-Agreement and anti-Indian demonstration and then to reject my request with a lot of publicity about the Indian High Commissioner’s effort being spurned. It was clear in my mind that I would not subject the Government of Indian to such a humiliation.’²²

There was no plan to humiliate Mr Dixit or the Government of India. It was simply a figment of his imagination. If the Indian diplomat had visited Thileepan and assured him that Delhi would fulfil the pledges the tragedy of his death would have been avoided and Indo-LTTE relations would not have been strained.

Following Thileepan’s death, Delhi exerted pressure on Dixit to persuade Jayawardane to institute an interim administrative authority with LTTE playing a predominant role.

The LTTE participated at meetings with Mr Dixit and other officials of the Indian mission at the IPFK Headquarters. I accompanied Pirapaharan during these meetings. Following extensive discussions, there was agreement on powers, functions and finally the composition of the envisaged Interim Administrative Council. Initially Jayawardane was reluctant to delegate executive powers on law and order, policing and taxation to the Council. After dilatory tactics Jayawardane agreed to devolve limited powers to maintain law and order to the administrative body. However, he demanded that, as President of the country, he should choose and appoint the Chief Administrator. He requested the LTTE leadership to recommend three names, from which he would make his choice. We realised that the old fox was playing his crafty game. The LTTE leader had already decided to appoint Mr N Pathmanathan, former Assistance Government Agent, Batticoloa. Pirapharan preferred an appointee from the eastern province to be the Chief Administrator. Since President Jayawardane was insisting on a panel of three persons to choose from, we listed Mr Pathmanathan as first in the order of preference along with two other names. Jayawardane deliberately chose the second person, Mr CVK Sivagnanam, Municipal Commissioner of Jaffna.

Pirapaharan was annoyed and requested me to convey to Mr Dixit that Mr Pathmanathan was the one and only choice of the LTTE for the post of Chief Administrator. On that day I shuttled between the IPKF Headquarters, and Pirapaharan’s residence in Jaffna carrying messages. Dixit told me over the phone that Jayawardane was adamant and unyielding. Pathmanathan, Jayawardane told the Indian High Commissioner, was more loyal to the LTTE than to the Government of Sri Lanka. He had helped the LTTE militants to escape from jail thereby violating the oath of allegiance to the government. He told Dixit, ‘I am still the President. I shall not be dictated to by a separatist militant group on every detail of how I should run the administration of a part of my country’.²³ Thus the intransigence of Jayawardane and the impotence of the Government of India led to the collapse of the Interim Administrative Authority pledged to the LTTE by Rajiv Gandhi.

October 1987 unfolded as the darkest period in the history of the Tamil political struggle. On 2 October a minor incident in the sea off Point Pedro blew up into a major catastrophe precisely because of the Sri Lanka government’s inflexible attitude and the incompetence of Rajiv’s administration in dealing with Jayawardane. The arrests of two senior LTTE commanders, Pulendran and Kumarappa and 15 high-ranking cadres by the Sri Lankan Navy and their mass suicide in custody at the Palali Air Base was a tragedy, of immense consequences. It was the straw that broke the camels back in terms of the tense relations between India and the Liberation Tigers.

During that critical time I was given the responsibility of persuading the IPKF High Command and the Indian High Commissioner to secure their release. Mr Dixit, who was in Delhi at that time, cancelled his holidays and rushed to Colombo to plead with Jayawardane to release the LTTE cadres. Initially Dixit assured us that the problem could be resolved amicably and the LTTE leaders and cadres would soon be released. But as time went by his tone began to change and his confidence began to falter. The following morning on 4 August, Dixit revealed to me that Lalith Athulathmuthali, the Minister of National Security, was firm in his demand that all the arrested LTTE cadres should be taken to Colombo for interrogation.²⁴ I told Dixit that the President had already proclaimed a general amnesty for all the members of the LTTE following the surrender of arms and therefore their arrest and the demand for interrogation by Sri Lanka constituted a violation of the Indo-Sri Lanka Accord. I also warned him of the far- reaching consequences that would arise if any harm came to our fighters. Furthermore, I pointed out that the Palali Air Base had been transformed into the military headquarters of the IPKF and therefore the safety and the release of the arrested LTTE cadres was the responsibility of India. Mr Dixit assured me that if Jayawardane failed to yield, he would advise the IPKF Commander, General Harkirat Singh, to secure their release.

Realising opinion in Colombo was hardening and with time running out, Dixit requested General Singh to take full control of Palali Air Base and not to allow the Sinhala soldiers to transport the LTTE cadres to Colombo. However, in my dealings with the IPKF commander I learned that his relations with the Indian High Commissioner were unfriendly and hostile. Subsequently, the General resented Dixit’s request and refused to concur, arguing that there was a chain of command, the GOC Southern Command, from whom he received proper orders. Later when I met General Singh, he was furious. ‘He is neither my superior nor is he a military person. If I carry out his orders there will be armed clashes between my troops and the Sri Lanka military personnel who are holding the LTTE fighters in their custody,’ the General told me. He said he was deeply disturbed over the arrest and detention of the senior LTTE cadres during the ceasefire. In the IPKF commander’s view it was a political issue and had to be resolved at the highest level between Colombo and Delhi.

When I visited Pulendran, Kumarappa and the others I told them Athulathmuthali was determined to have them transported to Colombo and that it was a very serious development. They knew what would happen to them if they were taken for interrogation and punishment. They immediately wrote and they all signed a letter to their leader, expressing their willingness to die rather then being subjected to torture. I delivered their letter to the Tiger leader. I watched as Pirapaharan’s eyes turned red and moist while he read. They had requested him to send them cyanide capsules. He reflected for some time and then collected the deadly poisonous capsules from his commandos and bodyguards and hung them around Mathya and my necks and told us to deliver them without fail. On the eventful day, 5 October 1987, I carried out the saddest assignment I have ever undertaken for the LTTE.

In the meantime, while Dixit desperately tried to persuade Jayawardane to relent, Athulathmuthali took rapid action. Exercising his authority as Minister of National Security he despatched a special military plane to Palali and issued orders to the Air Base Commander Brigadier Jayaratne, to shift the arrested LTTE cadres to Colombo by force. When the Sinhala soldiers were about to remove them, all the LTTE fighters swallowed cyanide. Pulendran, Kumarappa and 10 other senior cadres died immediately.

The news of the mass suicide of the LTTE leaders and cadres spread like wild fire throughout the Tamil homeland, inflaming passions of anger and revenge. The very fact that the tragedy took place at the headquarters of the IPKF turned the agonised masses hostile towards the Indian peacekeepers. Violence spread across the Tamil region. The Indian troops were jeered at and stoned and some were attacked. Tragically, reprisal killings of Sinhala civilians exploded into communal clashes in the eastern province. Jayawardane became furious and agitated; he revoked the general amnesty given to the Tamil Tigers and demanded that India take urgent action to restore order.

On 7 October the Indian Army Chief, General Krishnaswamy Sundarji and the Indian Defence Minister, KC Pant, flew to Colombo and conferred with the President. He was told of Delhi’s decision to disarm the LTTE by military force. Jayawardane was delighted that his strategy of turning the Indians against the Tamil Tigers had finally succeeded. ‘Operation Pawan’, a major offensive to disarm LTTE fighters and take control of the Jaffna Peninsula, was to be launched on 10 October.

The IPKF commanders – the Overall Force Commander of the Indian Forces in Sri Lanka, General Depinder Singh and the Jaffna IPKF Commander, General Harkirat Singh, were opposed to military confrontation with the LTTE. Such an armed conflict, they felt, would turn into the quagmire of protracted insurgency. They disliked the very concept of transforming a peacekeeping mission into an offensive war against the people whom they were obliged to protect under the Indo-Sri Lanka Accord.

On 6 October, before the outbreak of hostilities, General Sundarji visited Palali Headquarters of the IPKF to discuss the military strategy to disarm the Tigers. General Depinder Singh took the occasion to express his opposition to military action. Writing about the Indian military debacle in his book entitled ‘The IPKF in Sri Lanka’, published in 1992 after the Indian military withdrawal, Singh made the following comments on the decision to launch a war against the LTTE:

‘It was apparent that the political decision to employ force against the LTTE was already taken… My recommendation to General Sundarji was that we must not go in for the hard option because, if we did, we would be stuck in an insurgency situation for the next 20 years. I was admonished not to adopt a defeatist attitude to which my reply was that I was not being defeatist, merely realistic. The chief (General Sundarji) then flew off to Colombo. The next day IPKF HQ received direct instructions from the chief in Colombo to use force against the LTTE.’²⁵

General Depinder Singh made desperate efforts to forestall the military option. He tried to contact the Tamil Nadu chief Minister MGR. Unfortunately at that time MGR was critically ill in the United States. Instead, the General met Panduritte Ramachandran in Chennai and explained the disastrous consequences that might result if a military confrontation took place between the IPKF and the Tiger guerrillas. He pleaded with the Tamil Nadu Minister to persuade the Indian Prime Minister to reconsider the military option. It was of no avail. Having met with a negative response from Rajiv Gandhi, Minister Ramachandran informed Depinder Singh of the hardened feeling in Delhi that the LTTE ‘must be cut to size’.²⁶Commenting on his frustrated effort, Depinder Singh says that irrespective of his advice and warnings the decision to embark on a military crackdown against the Tamil Tigers was taken at the political top level. To quote him in this context:

‘I have no reason to doubt that my reservations on adopting the hard option and the inadequacy of troops were conveyed by the Chief of Army (General Sundarji) to the Defence Minister and the Prime Minster, and if thereafter, the decision to go ahead was taken despite that advice, it was again, a political decision.’²⁷

On 9 October the Prime Minister, Rajiv Gandhi and President Jayawardane, decided to ‘forcefully disarm the LTTE militants’ to implement the obligations of the of the Indo-Lanka Agreement. Rajiv Gandhi had already consulted his advisors, intelligence agencies and the Chief of Indian Army with regard to the consequences of confronting the LTTE fighters. Mr Dixit refers to a confidential meeting in Delhi, where Rajiv Gandhi enquired from the Army Chief of Staff, General Sundarji, about his assessment of disarming the LTTE by force. General Sundarji asserted that ‘the Indian armed forces would be able to neutralise them militarily within two weeks’.²⁸ Based on this assessment Rajiv Gandhi was not overly worried about the negative consequences.

In the early hours of 10 October 1987, the Indian troops raided the LTTE’s newspaper offices, radio and television stations in the city of Jaffna. The printing press of two pro-LTTE newspapers, ‘Elamurasu’ and ‘Murasoli’ were blown up and the journalists arrested. The LTTE television station ‘Nidarsanam’ was torched. LTTE guerrillas, using mortar fire, counter-attacked an IPKF military post at Tellipallai junction. An attempt by a convoy of Indian troops to leave the Jaffna Fort garrison was repelled by a barrage of LTTE mortar and machine-gun fire. A full-fledged Indo-LTTE war had broken out. With the outbreak of hostilities the LTTE Political Committee issued a statement lamenting:

‘While the LTTE and the people of Tamil Eelam were mourning over their dead heroes, the Government of India mobilised its peace keeping forces for a bloody war against the Tamils. Neither the Tamil people nor the LTTE anticipated, even in their wildest dreams, a war with India. India was their protector, guardian and saviour and the presence of Indian troops was looked upon as an instrument of peace and love. For the LTTE, India was their promoter, a friendly power, who provided sanctuary and armed assistance, an ally who respected its role in the liberation war and recognised its political importance. Therefore the Indian decision to launch a war against the LTTE took the Tamil nation by surprise and anguish.’²⁹

The war continued for two years and seven months, the longest war that India ever faced. Indian troops suffered heavy casualties; 1500 soldiers were killed and three or four times that number wounded, most of them maimed.³⁰ As an Indian journalist commented:

‘It was a monumental blunder that kept the IPKF bogged down in a futile war for more than two years. By the time, the last of the Indian troops sailed back home in March 1990, it had turned out to be the country’s biggest diplomatic-intelligence fiasco since the 1962 war with China.’³¹

Writing on the Indian intervention, a Sri Lanka military analyst characterised the Indo-Sri Lanka war as India’s Vietnam, as a war between a mighty power against a small, weak, but ‘iron willed’, foe enjoying popular support as ‘heroes of the people’. To quote him:

‘When the history of the twentieth century is chronicled, the military historians of the future will draw a parallel between four tragic wars: the American troops in Vietnam, the Chinese troops in Cambodia, the Soviet troops in Afghanistan and the Indian troops in Sri Lanka. This will be the failure of the armies of four great powers to subdue their enemy, smaller in number, weaker in strength, poorer in training, but at the same time, iron willed, devious in strategy and ruthless to their foe…India’s ‘enemy’ was everywhere and at all times; they were heroes of the people and came from the people; they were nurtured, harboured and supported by the local people.’³²

Pirapa’s Letters to Rajiv

The Indo-LTTE war was brutal and bloody. Both the Indian army and the Tamil Tiger guerrillas suffered heavy casualties. However, those who suffered the most were the Tamil civilians. There were several incidents of horrendous massacres by Indian troops. On the first day of the invasion of Jaffna, 11 October 1987, forty people were slaughtered at Pirambadi near Jaffna University where the LTTE leader lived. This bloody carnage took place when the Indian troops made a futile commando raid on that location to assassinate Pirapaharan and other senior leaders of the organisation. The most abominable outrage occurred on 21 October 1987. Indian troops stormed the Jaffna General Hospital spraying bullets and indiscriminately throwing hand grenades, resulting in the deaths of more than one hundred inmates, including 21 doctors and nurses. Less than a week later another terrifying bloodbath took place on 27 October in Chavakachcheri town. An Indian military helicopter launched a sudden attack, opening rocket and machinegun fire on a crowd in the market square. Thirty civilians were killed and 75 seriously injured.

It is beyond the theme of this work to list the series of massacres committed by the Indian armed forces. It suffices to say that from well-documented cases, more than four thousand Tamil civilians lost their lives during the period of Indian military occupation. Apart from the butchery, there were hundreds of cases of rape and the plunder of property from the public. Infuriated by the atrocities of the Indian soldiers, the Tamil population supported and sustained the armed resistance campaign of the Tiger guerrillas. When India declared war, the LTTE leadership was forced to choose between two unpleasant options. Surrendering would have meant certain death. The other option was to die fighting. Only in the second option did the Tigers have a possibility of survival, even success, if they conducted the war of resistance with courage, determination and resilience. More importantly, the second option gave them dignity: in death there was honour and heroism. For these reasons, Pirapaharan told me, he chose the second option, i.e. to fight and be prepared to die. When the LTTE leader took the high-risk option to fight the largest army in South Asia, he enjoyed wide support across the rank and file to follow his course. Though the objective conditions constrained the LTTE leadership to choose the path of strategic defence in the war with the Indian army, every effort was made to appease and reconcile with the Government of India. Within three months of the outbreak of hostilities, Pirapaharan wrote three letters to the Prime Minister of India pleading for cessation of hostilities and negotiated settlement. There was no response from Delhi.

The first letter was written on 12 October 1987, the third day after the declaration of war. The letter stated:

Honourable Prime Minister,

I wish to bring to your urgent attention of the grave and dangerous situation that has developed in Jaffna.

The Indian Peace Keeping Forces have declared war against the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam and commenced military offensive operations. We are compelled to fight back the Indian and Sri Lankan armed forces in self-defence, to protect and safeguard our fighters and our people from annihilation.

Our people are shocked and deeply distressed as the Government of India has declared war against our liberation organisation, which enjoys popular support. We are of the opinion that the declaration of war against the Liberation Tigers violates the very basis of the Indo-Lanka Agreement. It is the view of our people also.

A dangerous situation has arisen with the probability of heavy civilian casualties as a result of the offensive military operations undertaken jointly by the Indian forces and Sri Lankan troops. The Government of India will have to bear the full responsibility for such disastrous consequences.

I humbly appeal to you, in the name of peace and goodwill and on the basis of our good relations with the people of Indian, to instruct the Indian Peace Keeping Forces to cease all military offensive operations.

Velupillai Pirapaharan

Leader, LTTE

Two days later, on 14 October Pirapaharan sent a second, more detailed letter pleading with the Indian leader for peace and negotiations.

Honourable Prime Minister,

Since day by day the situation in Tamil areas is becoming critical and grave, with increasing incidents of death and destruction I am compelled to write to you again.

The crisis has deepened with massive civilian casualties in the Jaffna peninsula resulting from the military offensive operations by the Indian Peace Keeping Force. To date, 150 civilians have been killed and about 500 injured as a consequence of blind, indiscriminate artillery shelling, mortar fire and aerial bombardment. A large number of fighters belonging to our organisation have also been killed. We have in our custody 18 Indian soldiers as prisoners of war.

As the war is intensifying thousands of Tamils have been displaced as refugees. Because of the indefinite curfew there is an acute shortage of essential food items. As a consequence our people are being subjected to enormous suffering.

It is a sad tragedy that the Indian Peace Keeping Forces, who visited our homeland to protect our people and to establish peace and normalcy, have started a full-fledged war and are committing inhuman atrocities against our people. On the morning of the 11 October, 40 civilians, including women, children and university students, were massacred by the Indian military commandos at Primabadi, near the Jaffna city. We were shocked by the assault launched by the IPKF on the public institutions serving the people. Indian soldiers, who stormed into the offices of the Tamil dailies. ‘Elamurasu’ and ‘Murasoli’ blew the printing machines to pieces. Jaffna General Hospital, the only medical institution for the northern province, suffered extensive damage when the Indian forces launched heavy mortar fire from the Fort garrison. Yesterday several buildings of the Jaffna University were damaged by aerial bombardment.

The Government of India is engaged in a propaganda campaign denying the use of heavy weapons and fighter planes in the war. But in reality, the Indian and Sri Lankan planes and helicopters continue to indiscriminately attack civilian targets, causing heavy casualties. Our people are deeply shocked and saddened by such actions.

In compliance with the obligations of the Indo-Lanka Accord, the IPKF should maintain peace; they should protect the civilian public. These are their duties and mandates. Under the Accord, the IPKF does not have any legal provisions to wage war against a political organisation enjoying popular support. I appeal to you to send a fact finding mission to Jaffna comprising of international journalists, human rights representatives, Indian opposition party leaders to enquire and report to your government about the allegations of Indian military atrocities.

You are aware that both the governments of India and Sri Lanka have approached our organisation to set-up an Interim Administrative Authority in the northeastern province. This has demonstrated the fact that both governments have recognised the LTTE as the predominate political organisation in the Tamil region enjoying popular support. We have pledged to surrender the rest of the weapons once an interim administration is instituted. But it is unfortunate that the Government of India has declared a war against our organisation for the incidences of violence that erupted in the eastern province. Our organisation is not in anyway involved in the communal violence, which occurred in the east. What happened in the east was spontaneous outburst of communal violence following the tragic deaths of Pulendran and Kumarappa at the hands of Sinhala soldiers. The sorrow-stricken people of the east embittered by the sudden loss of these two senior commanders of Trincomalee and Batticoloa districts went berserk committing violence. We cautioned Mr Dixit, the Indian High Commissioner that serious consequences might arise if harm is done to the lives of our senior commanders. Mr Dixit has also warned President Jayawardane of serious consequences.

Our people are entitled to the democratic right to determine their own political destiny. It is unfair and unreasonable for a democratic country like India to impose its will and aspirations on our people at the point of a gun. Even though we have our own reservations we pledged to co-operate with the Government of India to implement the Indo-Lanka Agreement if the interests of our people are secured. In spite of this goodwill gesture, the decision of your government to annihilate us – the authentic representatives of our people – by military means is unfair, unjust and illegal. Therefore I humbly request you to initiate a process of negotiations with our liberation organisation to effect a cessation of hostilities and to restore peace, normalcy and ethnic harmony.

Velupillai Pirapaharan

Leader, LTTE

The LTTE leader again wrote to the Indian Prime Minister on 13 January 1988. In this third and final letter he again pleaded with the Indian leader for ceasefire and negotiations. Pirapaharan also pledged to lay down all weapons when the Interim Administrative Council was formed in accordance with the secret agreement reached between Rajiv and himself. The letter states:

Honourable Prime Minister,

As our people are suffering enormously as a consequence of intensified violence and disruption of peace and normalcy in Tamil areas, I kindly plead with you once again to initiate conciliatory measures to cease armed hostilities and to restore peace and normalcy in Tamil areas.

As a goodwill measure to initiate a peace process, I kindly request you to release all our cadres and supporters in the custody of the Indian Peace Keeping Force. I also urge you to advise President Jayawardane to declare a general amnesty to our fighters.

We pledge to lay down our weapons as soon as the Interim Administrative Authority is institutionalised with a preponderate role to the LTTE as we entered into an Accord in Delhi.

We wish to reiterate that our liberation organisation will co-operate with the Government of India in the implementation of the Indo-Lanka Agreement if the safety and security of the people are guaranteed and their interests promoted. We hold the view that the Provincial Council proposals as envisaged in the Indo-Lanka Agreement fail to fulfil the aspirations of the Tamil people. Nevertheless, we are confident that the LTTE will be allowed to play a major role in future deliberations to work out an adequate framework for a regional autonomy and self government that would satisfy the aspirations of our people.

I sincerely hope that you will give earnest and serious considerations to our views and take immediate steps to declare ceasefire and to commence negotiations with the objective of alleviating the suffering of our people and to create congenial conditions of peace and normalcy in the Tamil homeland.

Velupillai Pirapaharan

Leader, LTTE

There was no response from the Indian Prime Minister to Pirapaharan’s letters. The call for the cessation of hostilities and peace negotiations were interpreted in Delhi as a desperate cry from an organisation in disintegration. Indian intelligence agencies were feeding the Prime Minister’s office with misinformation, as if the collapse of the LTTE was imminent. Therefore, the more the LTTE leadership called for peace, the more military pressure it faced. Delhi had firmly decided to isolate and alienate the Tamil Tigers politically and to demobilise and destroy them militarily. In these circumstances there was no room for reviewing policy determinations. On one occasion we sent a feeler to General Depinder Singh expressing our preparedness to negotiate with the Government of India. The General conveyed the message to Delhi and to his surprise the response was negative. To quote him in this context:

‘Regrettably, the view taken in Delhi was that these feelers indicated that the end was close and, therefore, the requirement was to stop talking and turn the screw some more… I remember a telegram from the High Commissioner sent from Colombo to Delhi stating inter alia that according to information available to him, the LTTE collapse was imminent. On that I sent a message to Army Headquarters stating that… the factual position was that the LTTE were far from finished.’³³

In his book analysing the role of the IPKF in Sri Lanka, General Depinder Singh laments that the army’s view could not prevail in Delhi. This was because of, according to him, a lack of rapport between the Army Chief of Staff and the Prime Minister.

April 1988. Having escaped from the search and destroy operations of the IPKF, Adele and I were living underground in Bangalore. It was during that time I received an urgent message from Mr M Karunanithi, then Chief Minister of Tamil Nadu, to see him immediately. A secret meeting was arranged in a hotel suite in Salem, Tamil Nadu. I met him at midnight. Mr Murasoli Maran was with him. The Dravida Munnetra Kalagam (DMK) leader, Karunanithi, expressed serious concern about the military situation in Tamil Eelam particularly the danger of annihilation faced by the LTTE leadership. He enquired as to whether it would be prudent to lay down the weapons and surrender, rather than being wiped out by a formidable military power. I explained to him, to his surprise, that Pirapaharan and his fighters would be prepared to die for a noble cause rather than to surrender in humiliation and dishonour.

I convinced him that the Tamil freedom fighters were brave and dauntless and had the determination and resilience for a protracted guerrilla campaign. Furthermore, I told Mr Karunanithi that the LTTE leadership was prepared to cease all armed hostilities and negotiate with the Government of India for a peaceful settlement. We were prepared to lay down our weapons and co-operate if an interim administration was instituted as pledged by the Indian Prime Minister to the LTTE leader in Delhi.³⁴

The Tamil Nadu leaders assured us that they would convey our message to Rajiv Gandhi. Following the meeting Mr Murasoli Maran met the Indian Prime Minister and conveyed the LTTE’s desire for peace and negotiated settlement. Rajiv Gandhi was not impressed. The Prime Minister insisted, Mr Maran told me later, that the LTTE should lay down their weapons and surrender or face the fury of the Indian army.

The LTTE leadership thus lost all hope of reconciliation with Delhi. While intensifying the military offensive operations, Rajiv’s administration initiated the process of alienating and marginalizing the LTTE from political affairs. This was done by promoting other Tamil militant organisations in the political arena. On the advice of the Indian intelligence agencies, Delhi decided to foster and promote the EPRLF, a Marxist organisation extremely unpopular among the people of Tamil Eelam.

Jayawardane’s government colluded with Rajiv’s administration in undertaking a series of measures to institute a powerless, puppet provincial administration in the northeast and to install EPRLF as the ruling party.

Two pieces of legislation, the 13th Amendment to the Constitution and the Provincial Council Bill were rushed through Parliament to provide a constitutional form to the proposals conceived in the Indo-Lanka Agreement. A Citizens Volunteer Force (CVF) was established to enable the EPRLF and other non-LTTE organisations to form themselves into a powerful military structure to police the northeast. The Indian government provided the funds for this military force, which was also known as the Tamil National army, while the IPKF undertook the responsibility of training the personnel.

The Northeastern Provincial Council elections were held in November 1988. It was a fraudulent exercise organised and supervised by the Indian Forces in which the EPRLF gained the majority of seats and Varatharaja Perumal, a central committee member, was elected as the Chief Minister.

As soon as the Tamil provincial administration was formed it ran into serious difficulties as President Jayawardane opposed the functioning of the administrative headquarters in the city of Trincomalee. The Sinhala government resented the EPRLF efforts to establish Trincomalee as the capital of the northeastern Tamil homeland. Having refused to facilitate an office to the Northeastern Provincial Council, Jayawardane adopted dilatory tactics in devolving even the limited powers to the Council. Deprived of powers, funds and office facilities, Chief Minister Perumal spent months shuttling between Trincomalee and Colombo in a futile effort to establish his administration. Neither Rajiv Gandhi nor the Indian High Commissioner or the IPKF commanders could persuade the intransigent President to devolve power to the Tamil region.

With a paralysed Provincial administration, the long and arduous mediatory effort of the Indian government reached a blind alley. The EPRLF was thrown into the political wilderness. The crafty Jayawardane had led Rajiv Gandhi astray. The Sri Lanka leader succeeded in his treacherous diplomacy of turning the India army against the Tamil freedom movement. Having outwitted the Indians and hoodwinked the Tamils, President Jayawardane retired at the end of 1988, paving the way for Ranasinghe Premadasa to assume power. The incumbent President and his administration in Colombo adopted a new policy orientation, setting the stage for radical changes in the Indo-Lanka relations. Faced with an insurrectionary situation in the South by the JVP and a protracted guerrilla war led by the LTTE, President Premadasa invited both the Sinhala and Tamil rebel movements for talks. Realising that the new President was opposed to the Indian military presence in the Tamil homeland, the LTTE leadership decided to engage in peace talks with the Sri Lanka government. Our decision to negotiate with the Premadasa regime to seek the withdrawal of the Indian military force occupying the Tamil region was a severe blow to the Indian policy of politically isolating the LTTE and militarily neutralising them. As the peace talks commenced in Colombo, the Tamil Tigers emerged from the Indian imposed isolation as a powerful national movement representing the sentiments and aspirations of the people of Tamil Eelam. Mr Dixit, in his analysis of the Indian involvement in Sri Lanka as presented in his book ‘Assignment Colombo’ concedes that the Indian policy of isolating the LTTE from politics as well as from the Tamil people was a failure. Dixit says that he felt that:

‘India should deal with other groups bypassing the LTTE and isolating it. My assessment at that time was if other Tamil groups join the Indian initiative, the LTTE can be successfully isolated initially which would compel it to join the peace process. I was wrong in this assessment…. Mr expectation that the LTTE could be successfully isolated from the Sri Lankan Tamils also proved to be wrong, because I did not anticipate the various undercurrents and motivations in Sri Lankan and Indian politics which would contribute to the LTTE’s survival and its continuing capacity for struggle.’³⁵

The cardinal reason behind the failure of the Indian intervention in Sri Lanka, in my assessment, was the misjudgement by Rajiv Gandhi and his political advisors of the shrewd and perfidious mind-set of President Jayawardane. The Sri Lanka leader was neither sincere nor had the genuine political will to resolve the ethnic conflict in fairness to Tamil demands. Essentially a hardline Sinhala nationalist with strong majoritarian tendencies, Jayawardane, during his lengthy political history had refused to bestow justice to the Tamils. In his diplomatic dealings with Rajiv’s administration, Jayawar- dane did not adopt an overt confrontationist course; rather, he acted treacherously to convince the Indian leaders that he was genuinely committed to resolving the Tamil issue and to implementing the Accord. It would be appropriate to say that he acted in bad faith. Mr Dixit, who interacted with the Sri Lankan President very closely in the formulation of the Accord and other critical political issues, finally laments, ‘I over-estimated the sincerity and political will of Jayawardane to come to a genuine compromise with the Tamils with the help of the Government of India.’³⁶ The Indian government’s over-estimation and trust placed in Jayawardane, finally led to a diplomatic debacle when the Sri Lankan leader refused to devolve powers to the Tamil province, violating the obligations of the Accord.

On the other hand, in dealing with the Tamil issue, the Government of India severely under-estimated Pirapaharan’s will and determination to advance the cause of his people, even amidst seemingly insurmountable difficulties. This underestimation resulted in the Indian government subjecting the LTTE leader to various forms of pressure and persecution when he was in India and later when it unleashed a war to annihilate him and his organisation. Yet Pirapaharan survived the ordeals and continues to carry on the struggle of his people. Mr Dixit, who was severely critical of Pirapaharan during the Accord times, ultimately compliments him for his tenacity in the following terms:

‘I met the leaders of practically all Tamil militant groups during my four years in Colombo. Pirapaharan naturally stands out among them. Regardless of the criticisms and prejudices that I may have about this young man, I cannot help but acknowledge his deep idealism and his political and military skills… Events over the years have shown him as an accomplished political strategist and military tactician, qualities strengthened further by his forbearance and his capacity for survival.. His surviving the IPKF and carrying on his struggle has made him a folk hero among his people.’³⁷

Dixit made the above evaluation of the Tamil Tiger leader in his penetrating study of the Indian involvement in Sri Lanka written ten years after the signing of the Indo-Lanka Accord. Having confessed that he over-estimated Jayawardane, Dixit concedes that India under-estimated Pirapaharan. ‘One over-arching miscalculation of India was our under-estimating Prabakaran’s passionate, even obsessive commitment to the cause of Tamil Eelam … his tactical cleverness and his resilience in adversity.’³⁸

India’s mishandling of the Tamil liberation struggle to secure her geo-strategic interests was also an important factor for the failure of the Indian intervention in Sri Lanka. It is true that India had genuine geo-strategic concerns at that particular historical conjuncture.

Indian intervention was motivated by apprehensions that the involvement of adverse external forces could destabilise India’s security environment. To remove that threat, Delhi covertly manoeuvred the Tamil armed resistance movement, spearheaded by the LTTE, in military operations against the Sri Lankan state. In that process the Government of India succeeded in achieving her geo-strategic objective of binding Sri Lanka within her sphere of influence and removing the threat of adverse external forces. The Accord, while securing India’s interests, gave primacy to the unitary structure of the Sri Lankan state by pledging to safeguard the ‘unity and territorial integrity’ of the island. Such an obligation in the Accord helped to reinforce the already entrenched Sri Lanka unitary constitution that closed the space for the formation of an authentic regional self-government in the Tamil homeland that would satisfy the political aspirations of the Tamil people. In other words, Indian intervention, which was primarily motivated to secure Delhi’s self-interest, ignored the ethos of the Tamil national struggle; the drive, the spirit and the determination of the oppressed Tamil nation to fight for its political freedom. Thus India’s intervention failed to resolve the Tamil ethnic conflict, but rather made the issue more complex and left the Tamil freedom movement to continue to fight a lonely and bitter struggle against a callous enemy.

References and Notes

1. Gunaratna. R. ‘Indian Intervention in Sri Lanka: The Role of India’s Intelligence Agencies.’ Colombo 1993.

2. Dixit. JN. ‘Assignment Colombo.’ Konark Publishers, Delhi 1998.

3. Ibid, page 327.

4. Mr G Parthasarathy told me about Mrs Gandhi’s reservations concerning Jayawardane during private conversations I had with him at his residence in Delhi in the period 1984-85.

5. Mr Pirapaharan had been released on bail following a shooting incident between Uma Maheswaran and himself at Pandy Bazaar in Chennai. He was living with Pala Nedumaran at his residence in Madurai from where he left for Jaffna.

6. Mrs Gandhi took a bold step to create Bangladesh by invading East Pakistan in 1971, not purely for altruistic reasons of liberating the oppressed East Bengali nation, but for the geo-strategic objective of weakening an aggressive hostile neighbour.

7. These operations were recorded in the Diary of Combat (1975 -1984) compiled by me as an official publication in December 1984.

8. Dixit. JN ‘Assignment Colombo’, page 306. Konark Publishers, Delhi, 1998.

9. Mr Saxena was appointed as the National Security Advisor to Rajiv Gandhi and later assumed the position Governor of Jammu and Kashmir.

10. Narayan Swamy. MR . ‘Tigers of Lanka. From Boys to Guerrillas’, page 147. 3rd Edition, Vijitha Yapa Publications. Colombo 2002

11. Joint Memorandum by the ENLF to the Authorised Representative of the Government of Indian, 18.06.1985.

12. Joint Response of the Tamil Delegation on the concluding day of phase 11 of the Thimpu talks on 17 August 1985.

13. Joint statement of the 17 August 1985 made by the Tamil delegation immediately prior to walking out of the Thimpu Talks.

14. Dixit. JN. ‘Assignment Colombo’. Page 41-42. Konark Publishers, Delhi.

15. Ibid. page 43-44.

16. The details of my arrest and deportation have been extensively treated in the book ‘The Will to Freedom’ by Adele Balasingham.

17. Dixit. JN. ‘Assignment Colombo’. Page 57.

18. Gunaratne. R ‘Indian Intervention in Sri Lanka’. Page 167.

19. This information was conveyed to Mr Dixit from the Sri Lanka government sources. See page 96 in his book ‘Assignment Colombo’.

20. Dixit. JN ‘Assignment Colombo’. Page 118.

21. The LTTE did not have an official representative in Singapore at that time. We suspect that the anonymous person who claimed to be the representative of the LTTE and conveyed the telephone message must have been a RAW operative.

22. Dixit. JN ‘Assignment Colombo’. Page 202.

23. Ibid. page 207.

24. Athulathmuthali wanted to avenge the massacres of Sinhala civilians in the Trincomalee and Batticoloa districts, allegedly by Pulendran and Kumarappa, according to Dixit’s accounts.

25. Singh. Lt General Depinder. ‘The IPKF in Sri Lanka’. Trishul Publishers, New Delhi 1992.

26. Ibid. page 86.

27. Ibid. page 87.

28. Dixit. JN ‘Assignment Colombo’. Page 156.

29. see LTTE document ‘You Too India’ by LTTE Political Committee, 1987.

30. Singh. D ‘The IPKF in Sri Lanka’. Page 201.

31. Narayan Swamy. MR ‘Tigers of Lanka. From Boys to Guerrillas’. Page 269.

32. Gunaratna. R. ‘Indian Intervention in Sri Lanka: The Role of India’s Intelligence Agencies.’ Colombo 1993.

33. Singh. D. ‘The IPKF in Sri Lanka’ page 128.

34. Ibid. page 128

35. Dixit. JN. ‘Assignment Colombo’. Page 344

36. Ibid. Page 344.

37. Ibid. Page 320 38. Ibid. Page 43

References and Notes

Chapter II: Indian Intervention in Sri Lanka

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