The unity of the Battle of the Theechuvalai the way Russia overthrew Ukraine.

The unity of the Battle of the Theechuvalai the way Russia overthrew Ukraine.

(Article written 2 years ago. I have reposted this to commemorate April 24, 2001 and for the purpose of passing on history.)

Regarding the Battle of the Theechuvalai, military analyst Taraki Sivaram has mentioned the following in his article.

“The LTTE has introduced a new dimension of counter-measures that can successfully counter the above three-dimensional conventional troop movement tactics.

That is, letting the enemy come, accurately targeting their route, launching artillery and mortar attacks from the rear, thereby scattering them into the minefields that line those routes.

Then launching ambush attacks along pre-arranged routes through those minefields. I have been scouring military history books for the past week to see if anyone has ever used the LTTE counter-measures before. Still no answer.”

I have read and thought about the last paragraph of his article many times.

“I have been searching for military history books for the past week to see if anyone has ever used the LTTE’s counter-tactics of conducting diversionary attacks. I have yet to find an answer.”

Forces on the defensive will construct various types of defense lines to stop an attacking enemy force. This is not new in military history. It is ancient.

What does Taraki Sivaram mean by searching military history books to see if anyone has ever used this tactic used by the LTTE?

During the firefight, the LTTE ‘shaped’ the movement of the Sri Lankan army by drawing it in. The LTTE conducted their attack in such a way as to push the Sri Lankan army into an area that was already heavily mined. After entering that area, it became a graveyard for the Sri Lankan army. This is what Taraki Sivaram is referring to.

The LTTE used this tactic when about 15,000 Sri Lankan soldiers advanced through a narrow strip of land with unprecedented fire support.

The firefight was the most intense firefight of the wars that had ever taken place.

Commander Theeban, who led the firefight, states that “more than 50,000 shells, artillery shells, multi-barrel missiles, and aircraft bombs were fired by the troops during the 60-hour firefight and firefight.”

The firefight took place on April 24, 2001.

At that time, there was no information about the sophisticated defense lines that the LTTE had set up in that narrow strip of land.

After the war ended in 2009, information about this began to emerge.

One of them was the information provided by Kamal Gunaratne, who was the Brigadier of the 53rd Division of the Sri Lankan Army.

In the article ERASING THE EELAM VICTORY Part 14 E by KAMALIKA PIERIS, Kamal Gunaratne explained what kind of defense lines the LTTE had built within that narrow territory. This article was published in 2020.

In that article, Kamal Gunaratne describes the battles that took place with the LTTE in the Mugamalai, Palai, Kalali, and Nagerkovil areas during the 4th Eelam War (2006-2009).

“The LTTE had buried mines very densely throughout the terrain identified as areas where fighting could take place in these areas. They had also built large earthen mounds and bunkers. They had built two Forward Defense Lines (FDL).”

“This FDL was established by the LTTE from Kalali, Mugamalai to Nagerkvoil. The LTTE had planted landmines in the Mugamalai area. In these Mugamalai areas alone, more than 500 Sri Lankan soldiers lost their legs.”

“The Sri Lankan army’s main battle tanks and infantry could not maneuver in this narrow terrain. We lost many tanks to the LTTE’s anti-tank attacks.”

“The LTTE was able to attack the army at any time. Their attacks were very precise. They have entered the army and ‘boxed’ it many times and attacked. In one LTTE attack, Sri Lanka lost 6 armored vehicles, 4 T-55 tanks and 2 BMPs. In this, 130 Sri Lankan soldiers were killed.”

“The Sri Lankan army always suffered heavy losses in Mugamalai. In the operations conducted by the army in this area, it has become common for about 200 soldiers to be killed or wounded.”

Kamal Gunaratne says the following in the first place.

“If we take all the Eelam wars together, the Mugamalai battle (2008) was the decisive battle.”

(This article is partially linked as a picture)

According to Kamal Gunaratne, it is clear how sophisticated the LTTE had built defense lines in the Kalali, Mugamalai, Nagerkovil, and Palai areas.

From this, we can see that what Taraki Sivaram mentioned is not an exaggeration.

Now I am coming to 2024.

I happened to hear that Russia used this same war strategy to thwart Ukraine’s counter-offensive.

In June 2023, the Ukrainian army launched a counter-offensive against Russia.

The West was confident that this counter-offensive would defeat the Russian forces.

From December 2022 to June 2023, the weapons for this counter-offensive were made. Many heavy weapons were supplied by the West. The West provided main battle tanks (MBTs) such as the British Challenger 2, the German Leopard, and the American M1 Abrams

But on the other hand, the Russian army had been building defense lines for several months in anticipation of this counter-offensive and to thwart it.

The length of these defense lines was several hundred km.

They had set up an anti-tank ditch as the 1st defense line. It would mainly use anti-tank weapons.
The second line of defense was made of concrete blocks in the shape of a pyramid. This was called Dragon’s teeth.
The third line of defense was a zigzag trench. The reason for this was that when the enemy shells hit, the fragments of the explosion would not hit the angled shape on the side. Also, even if the enemy captured this zigzag trench, they would not be able to shoot in a straight line. The curved angle would help them to attack from a hidden position.
The artillery of the Russian forces was stationed several kilometers away from the 3rd defense line.
In addition, at the beginning of these defense lines, mines were planted in a very dense area of several thousand square kilometers between them. (Pictures explaining this are below)

There are many obstacles to the movement of the main battle tank of the Ukrainian forces through these first three defense lines. During the delay caused by these obstacles, the Russian artillery behind will launch a precise attack.

The defense line built by Russia is called Elastic Defense.

Because if the Russian army loses a defense line and retreats, it will stand and fight at the next line. If it loses that too, the next line.

In this way, the Russian forces will absorb all the attack fire of the advancing Ukrainian forces. Then the Russian army will gather all its resources at the right moment and capture the lost lines through a counter-attack.

Military analysts say that this war was the first time a country had built such a sophisticated defense line since World War II.

It is at this point that the point mentioned by Taraki Sivaram comes in.

Andrew Rasiulis, an Eastern Europe defense analyst, mentions this point.

“Russian forces ‘shaped’ the movement of the attacking Ukrainian forces. The Russian forces conducted the attack in such a way that the Ukrainian forces gradually entered a ‘specific territory’. That ‘specific territory’ is Russia’s killing zone.”

I will conclude this article with another important point.

Russia successfully repelled Ukraine’s counter-offensive. In this, Ukraine lost hundreds of thousands of soldiers. It lost most of its heavy weapons. To be more precise, this counter-offensive by Russia was the first step towards the defeat that Ukraine was going to face. It was with this that the West began to realize that it had shot in the arm.

Similarly, the army was unable to break the defense lines set up in the Mugamalai, Palai, and Kalai areas until the end.

After the LTTE captured Aanayiravu in 2000, this long frontline defense layer of Kalai-Nagerkovil-Mugamalai was created.

From then until January 2009, these areas were under the control of the LTTE.

After the Sri Lankan army captured Poonagari and Paranythan, Commander P.P.A.K. ordered the troops of Commander Deepan to retreat, as they were difficult to hold due to geographical constraints.